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Before the Law stands a
door-keeper. To this doorkeeper
there comes a man from the
country and prays for admittance
to the Law. But the doorkeeper
says that he cannot grant
admittance at the moment... The
doorkeeper gives him a stool and
lets him sit down at one side of the
door. There he sits for days and
years. He makes many attempts to
be admitted, and wearies the
doorkeeper by his importunity.
The doorkeeper frequently has




should apply the same
standards to
immigration laws that it
applies to all other laws.
little interviews with him, asking him questions about his
home and many other things, but the questions are put
indifferently, as great lords put them, and always finish
with the statement that he cannot be let in yet...
"Everyone strives to reach the Law," says the man, "so
how does it happen that for all these many years no one
but myself has ever begged for admittance?" The
doorkeeper recognizes that the man has reached his end,
and, to let his failing sense catch the words, roars in his
ear: "No one else could ever be admitted here, since this
Frank H. Wu is an Assistant Professor at Howard University
School of Law. Prior to becoming a professor, Mr. Wu was a
Teaching Fellow at Stanford Law School. He received his
degrees from Johns Hopkins University and University oJ
Michigan Law SchooL Professor Wu also writes for The New
York Times Syndicate and Asian Week.
Constitution supports
gate was made only for you, I am
now going to shut it."1
INTRODUCTION
This article presents a
moderate proposal for immigration
reform: the Supreme Court should
apply the same standards to
immigration laws that it applies to
all other laws. The constitutional
limits that govern at the -borders
should be similar to the
constitutional limits which are
accepted everywhere else.
The proposal rests on textual
and structural rationales. A
literalist interpretation of the
the proposal, because many of the
rights articulated in the document are attributed to
individuals and not necessarily limited to citizens. A
structural approach to the Constitution also supports the
proposal, because under even a restrictive reading of
equal rights, the equality of citizens is compromised by
immigration legislation.
As an initial matter, the Court should abolish the
archaic doctrine of "plenary power," which it developed a
century ago in a series of cases upholding immigration
policies that today a consensus would regard as being
based on race in the most objectionable sense. The
plenary power doctrine is a judicial creation from an era
the constitutional theory of which has been superseded in
almost all other respects. It rests on an erroneous
understanding of challenges to immigration policies,
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than citizens. Efforts to restrict immigration across the
national border and efforts to limit migration over state
and local boundaries share the same objectionable
features, and the Court has recognized the problems at the
latter levels.
This article describes some effects of applying
domestic constitutional norms in the area of immigration.
A Supreme Court that chose to follow this course would
overrule some earlier precedent, but it likely would
validate much contemporary immigration law and all but
the most extreme pending legislation. It may even
strengthen, rather than weaken, the distinction between
citizens and aliens.
As a corollary to the change in substantive standards,
citizens would more clearly have standing to challenge
immigration statutes for their impact on native
communities. In turn, citizen standing forms part of a
reconception of how the immigration debates impinge
upon the status on citizens, especially racial minorities
perceived as foreign. The relationship of immigration and
civil rights, captured by the so-called "blacks versus
browns" dilemma, shows how immigration law should
alter our understanding of color-blindness as a
constitutional theory. In the greatest departure from prior
thinking, but closest alignment with political realities, the
constitutional change would reinforce a corresponding
conceptual change: immigration issues should be
understood as intimately related to civil rights issues.
The article responds to current conservative efforts
to restrict immigration. But in a sense it is addressed to
the liberal who has been sympathetic to immigrants
though also ambivalent about the relatively high numbers
of immigrants that the United States is now receiving and
the accompanying social changes, real and perceived. In a
response to restrictionists who have attempted to portray
their opposition as motivated by self-interest or emotions,
the article offers a set of principles that are extended from
conventional constitutional theory and applied in a new
manner. This proposal falls between the philosophical
extremes, on the one hand that the sovereign nation can
make any decisions whatsoever with respect to outsiders,
and on the other hand that a liberal democracy lacks moral
authority to refuse entry to anyone. The article is an
attempt to advance an agenda for positive social change,
rather than merely defending against extreme reactionary
proposals.
The article is organized into three sections. Section I
summarizes the current debate over immigration and
provides an overview of the dynamics of that debate.
Section II describes social and political trends which
connect the debates on the national border to debates over
state and local boundaries. Section III analyzes the
application of domestic constitutional standards to
immigration law.
I. WITH LIBERALS LIKE THESE, WHO NEEDS
CONSERVATIVES?
Proponent of a military presence on the U.S.-Mexico
border:
I've been a liberal Democrat all my life.
A. THE ASCENDANT REACTIONARY VIEW OF
IMMIGRATION
As "the American Century" approaches its end,
immigration issues have become so divisive that reform
can mean anything from abolishing immigration to
abolishing immigration laws.3 Immigration policies are
means of defining the national community and giving
meaning to the concept of citizenship. In their
contradictory efforts to develop immigration policies,
liberals have become scared of the straw man of "political
correctness." In contrast to the confused reactions of
liberals, conservatives have consistently appealed to
color-consciousness, not color-blindness, in developing
their vision of an immigration policy.
4
Under the guise of attacking "political correctness,"
immigration restrictionists have appealed to a racialized
vision of citizenship. Their arguments have attracted wide
popular support. Whether it is called "politically correct"
or "politically incorrect," however, the troubling trend is
toward closing the borders and prohibiting further
immigration, legal or otherwise.
5
Today, the most prominent proponent of
immigration restriction is Peter Brimelow. Brimelow -
himself an immigrant from England 6 - has authored the
polemical tract, Alien Nation: Common Sense About
America's Immigration Disaster. A few years earlier,
Brimelow had written a magazine article that would serve
as a preliminary draft of Alien Nation.8 His concern then
was whether immigrants would assimilate.9 His distress
has now sharpened, as he has concluded that immigrants
are racially inassimilable.
10
By making his arguments both more expansive and
more extreme in book form, Brimelow has shaped the
substance and the style of the immigration debate.11 He
says nothing new in his work. 12 His book has its roots in
a long line of arguments that have been made since the
founding of the nation. 13
During the decade preceding publication of
Brimelow's book, a few other advocates for lowering
levels of immigration had operated at the margins of
mainstream politics.14  But overall, anti-immigrant
activities had been in a lull since 1965,15 when Congress
finally replaced with a new system an immigration system
borne of the turn-of-the-century eugenics and Social
Darwinist movements. The pre-reform statutory scheme
discriminated against not only people of color but also
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white ethnic groups. It did so intentionally and explicitly
through national origin quotas designed to maintain a
racial balance equivalent to the early twentieth century
composition of the country.1
6
Following passage of the 1965 Immigration and
Nationality Act,17 immigration increased, especially Asian
and Latino immigration. Immigration again became a
divisive issue in the early 1990s. It was then that the
Census revealed that whites might become a racial
minority group in the foreseeable future.
Accompanying the change in the color of
immigrants, the recent round of the battle over
immigration began during the 1992 Presidential elections.
Adopting an "America First" attitude in an aggressive
challenge to then incumbent President George Bush,
conservative candidate Pat Buchanan casually remarked
on the David Brinkley television show that "I think God
made all people good, but if we had to take a million
immigrants in, say Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and
put them in Virginia, what group would be easier to
assimilate and would cause less problems for the people
of Virginia?'" As Buchanan explained at greater length
in his syndicated column, America had become "so
uncivil and angry" because "a flood tide of immigration
has rolled in from the Third World."' 9
Anti-immigrant arguments prevailed in the 1994
California elections. By ballot referendum, a majority of
voters in the state passed Proposition 187 (Prop. 187), a
measure which was ostensibly focused on "illegal"
immigrants but expressly covered any individual
"suspected" of being an "illegal" immigrant.20 Prop. 187
echoed Brimelow's magazine article arguments with its
call-to-arms preamble. Through Prop. 187, "the People of
California [found and declared] that they have suffered
and are suffering economic hardship caused by the
presence of illegal aliens."21 As proponents of Prop. 187
declared to voters, "you are the posse and [the proposal] is
the rope."
' '
After their victory, the hard-core backers of Prop.
187 went on to attack legal immigrants as well, much to
the chagrin of some of their supporters who had believed
campaign promises that the targets were "illegal"
immigrants only. The hard-core view reflects the belief
that an astute observer ascribed to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS): "a legal immigrant is merely
an illegal alien with papers."
3
Inspired by Prop. 187, pending federal legislation,
which has a high likelihood of passing (or having already
passed prior to publication of this symposium issue), may
be the most significant revision of immigration laws in a
generation. The leading bills share as their primary
feature lower limits on legal immigration.24  Some
restrictionists are advocating amending the Constitution to
end birthright citizenship.25 The restrictionist policies
envisioned by Brimelow would become law through these
proposals.26 It would be an understatement to say that if
immigration restrictionists succeed in the legislative
process and the statutes subsequently survive court
challenges, the new era of immigration policy will
significantly alter the future of the United States - for
better or for worse.
In its latest form, immigration law has expanded in
its reach. Just as it does not end with "illegal"
immigrants, it also does not stop at the border. Whatever
its merits, Prop. 187 does not touch on the event of
crossing the border and entering the United States, but
instead reaches the conduct of citizens and' those
presumed to be aliens in their daily lives within the
community.
27
And so it is that Brimelow, by reintroducing a vision
of America as racially white and culturally homogeneous,
has captured public attention with his anti-immigrant
attacks. If the title of his book were not signal enough, his
thesis is stated succinctly: "America needs another time-
out from immigration."' He is forthright in declaring his
allegiance to an America that is in conception racial rather
than political; his nation is one of white men, not one of
laws.
Brimelow's primary argument purposefully blends
the racial and the cultural: "Race is destiny in American
politics" because "[c]ulture is a substitute for ethnicity."
29
As he makes similar statements throughout his book,3 °
never bothering to define race, ethnicity or culture, or
critically question the meaning of those concepts, he can
be taken quite fairly as assuming that race and culture are
essentially equivalent.
Even to another immigration restrictionist,
Brimelow's argument should appear to be curiously
missing the crucial link between race and culture. He has
only to say, in response to another writer who asserted that
he was promoting "the racial hegemony of white
Americans": "I was immediately stricken by guilt..., 31
Brimelow's guilt did not last long:
But then it occurred to me: Suppose I had
proposed more immigrants who looked like
me? [Until 1950] nine out of ten Americans
looked like me... And in those days, they had
another name for this thing dismissed so
contemptuously as "the racial hegemony of
white Americans." They called it "America."
32
As for any inquiry about whether an American who failed
to look like Brimelow could assimilate to become more
like him, his response is threatening: "the only possible
answer is: they'd better."
33
Brimelow repeats himself often enough to dispel
doubt that he means to "set forth," as Michael Lind noted,
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"what looks very much like a defense of old-fashioned
white racial nationalism." 34  Brimelow writes, "The
American nation has always had a specific ethnic core.
And that core has been white." 35 To be more precise, "the
American stew of 1790... for better or worse... tasted
distinctly British. 36 His complaint is that Americans are
unwilling to think in terms of racial group generalizations,
even when he (and implicitly they) believe them to be
true.
37
Brimelow opens and closes by arguing that Asian
Americans 38 and Latinos39 who are immigrants and
support immigration are alienated from America;40 they
threaten to "break down white America's sense of
identity."'4' Furthermore, blacks, in whose economic
condition Brimelow professes to take an interest,4 2 fare
poorly in Brimelow's racial analysis. In particular, Zulus
have not reached the level of "Alfred the Great, let
alone... Elizabeth II or any civilized society," as
Brimelow is compelled to add. 3 Haitian refugees should
not be "embraced" (a figurative phrase used by New York
Times columnist Abe Rosenthal) because "some 3 percent
of the Haitian refugees at Guantanamo tested HIV-
positive." 4
Likewise, Brimelow disparages white ethnic groups.
He remarks, "[i]n recent years the Mafia or Cosa Nostra
has been in decline, not least because of the acculturation
of Italian Americans. 45  The Irish immigrants of the
nineteenth century "displayed social pathologies striking
similar to those of the contemporary American black
ghetto," but they improved over the next several
generations because "America changed the Irish - and
they changed themselves."
46
Of course, Brimelow sees some positive points in
immigration. He is "sentimental" about Asian
immigration, in part because, as he recounts it, "the young
female students I see every morning entering the Parsons
School of Design [in New York City, next to his office]
are very charming, and fashionable."
4 7
Brimelow's secondary argument is economic:
immigration "is a luxury. And like all luxuries, it can help
- or it can hurt."8 He devotes many pages to a cost-
benefit analysis of immigration, 49 but admits that rational
calculations can conceal racial beliefs.5 0
In later presentations of his proposals, Brimelow has
varied. On some occasions, he has been more outrageous,
and on other occasions more circumspect. He has called
the move toward race-neutral immigration policies the
"absurd end of the anti-Nazi crusade" and described the
resulting shifts in the racial composition of the country as
"Hitler's posthumous revenge." 51 He also has argued for
lowering immigration levels with only an uncharacteristic
passing reference to the racial characteristics of current
immigrants.
5 2
In finishing off his attack on immigrants, Brimelow
has the gall to suggest that he and other critics of
immigration be called - one might imagine the requisite
drumroll - "Patriots." 53 As self-important as he is, it
would be difficult to write a better parody of Brimelow
than Brimelow himself has done.5 If only he were
making mischief with his italicized warning, "Remember
- practically until the Civil War, white Protestants were
America."
55
Unintentionally, Peter Brimelow has done liberals a
service by revealing what is wrong with the conservative
view of immigration. Unfortunately, his will be the
prevailing view unless liberals take up the issue
aggressively.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF IMMIGRATION
Instead of reacting to Brimelow and his peers,
liberals should advance their own agenda for positive
social change. Liberals may be currently divided on
immigration issues, but liberal principles should reunite
them.
56
While it may seem less than an ideal moment in
American history to suggest that the borders should be
more open than closed, the country has always had an
ambivalent attitude toward immigration, seeing it through
an opposed pair of traditions.5 7 The positive myth,
symbolized by the Statue of Liberty, celebrates the
contributions of innumerable ethnic groups. The negative
myth, contained in metaphors of a floodtide, an invasion,
and the Tower of Babel, condemns the literal and
symbolic costs associated with absorbing newcomers.
It may be heartening, then, to remember that anti-
immigrant forces were regarded as extremist until
recently. Whether these trends run in cycles, the
arguments here are offered with the hope that over time
reason will prove persuasive.
The dormant fissure among liberals on immigration,
especially "illegal" immigration, erupted again during the
campaign for Prop. 187.5s The ballot measure introduced
a theme that resonated in the ensuing public discourse: "I
am a liberal - BUT. ."59
Like everyone else, liberals filled in the blank with
reactions ranging from "this is a country of laws and
there's a right way and a wrong way to become a citizen,"
to "immigration hurts the most disadvantaged among us."
Liberals rationalized their litany of complaints as a
principled form of selfishness. By their negative image,
immigrants compete for jobs, consume affirmative action
benefits, or become dependent on welfare entitlements.
They might refuse to learn English and assimilate, and
instead become militant multi-culturalists. They are
among the sources of crime, terrorism, disease, pollution,
and overpopulation.6°  Many politicians, pundits and
voters expressed their feeling defensively, as the mayor of
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW
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a California city did. Well before the Prop. 187 campaign
was underway, when immigration was an issue of local
concern, this politician argued for posting the military on
the U.S.-Mexico border, insisting as he did so, "I've been
a liberal Democrat all my life."
61
Against this movement of the majority, the moderate
proposal that should persuade liberals is as follows: in
considering "reform" options, apply the same standards at
the border that apply within the borders. 62 Stated in terms
of constitutional law: eliminate the plenary power doctrine
and permit challenges to immigration laws that
discriminate based on suspect classifications such as
race.63 There is nothing wrong with limiting immigration,
but it should be troubling if the limits are racial, either
explicitly or implicitly.64
By such standards, the racial justifications used to
define outsiders and keep them out, which might seem
seductive at the national border, appear as repulsive as
they would at any other border. Many ideas that are
considered within the mainstream where the national
border is concerned would be rejected as racist by any
definition of that term and beyond the pale if applied at
any other border: taking military measures,65 building a
wall,66 violent vigilante actions, 67 and routine detention.68
These ideas are all the more disturbing where internal
migrants are racially different - as they often are -
outsiders literally and metaphorically. Every argument
advanced by Brimelow applies with the same force to new
residents of a state or would-be neighbors in a suburb.
That Brimelow dislikes the conception of the nation as a
civil society with a unifying political identity should make
it easier to transfer his arguments from the national level
to state and local levels. If anything, the realities of the
situation should compel a reversal in thinking: the national
border is less, not more, critical than state and local
boundaries to the extent that a genuine community wishes
to maintain its identity and well-being. 69  Many
Americans, 70  however, would balk at adopting
Brimelow's suggestions at borders within the United
States, either state or local. That inconsistency is the
potential source of progressive social change.
Set alongside one another, as Joseph Carens has
argued,71 arguments for limiting immigration are virtually
the same as the arguments used to prevent "Okie" farmers
displaced from the dustbowl from moving to California
during the Depression, and prohibiting African Americans
from moving into suburban neighborhoods during the civil
rights era. It is inconsistent, and should be subject to legal
scrutiny, to believe that the national border can be
controlled in a manner that would be indisputably
unconstitutional and deemed unwise at a local or state
boundary line. It would be consistent, although subject to
legal scrutiny for other reasons, to believe that all borders
can be controlled by equally extreme measures.
Immigration restrictionists have used various
rhetorical tricks to distinguish between borders. These
procedural and structural moves have neither logical nor
moral significance. They deserve little legal
consideration. The argument of national sovereignty,
their favorite device, has historical counterparts that carry
little intellectual weight, among progressives at any rate.
"National sovereignty" finds an equivalent in "states'
rights," invoked by the South during the Confederacy and
a century later in the reaction against the civil rights
movement.72  "National sovereignty" has another
equivalent in the "local control" repeatedly asserted by
counties, townships and municipalities as an ineffective
bulwark against external influences.
As Bruce Ackerman has observed, the assumption
that the national border has special significance eventually
must fall back on the assertion that it is different by
nature.7 3 It rests, at bottom, on little more than its own
definition - power rather than principle. At best, it
depends on priority in time as a compelling claim; i.e., the
people who arrived earlier are entitled to exclude the
people who appeared later.74  Even then, Brimelow's
approach reads into priority in time an implicit guarantee
of racial group entitlement. Without this racial link, the
immigration restrictionist position makes no sense. It is
the racial group, not the individual, whose arrival counts
for the creation of rights.75
Yet it would be naive verging on utopian to argue for
open borders and against the existence of nations. In a
world with severe socioeconomic differences among
nations, and for a country that has an extensive welfare
system, it would be impossible to adopt a policy of
allowing entry to every potential immigrant.
Nothing so extreme need be proposed. National
sovereignty must be accepted.76 National sovereignty,
however, establishes only that the nation can regulate its
borders. National sovereignty, by itself, does not establish
that the nation can regulate its borders by standards that a
consensus would hold absurd applied everywhere else.
Thus, even if national sovereignty establishes that the
United States can and should distinguish among potential
new citizens, it does not directly follow that race-based
restrictions on immigration are natural or any more
acceptable at the border than elsewhere.
77
Understood in this manner, national sovereignty
speaks to challenges by aliens or by foreign governments
to United States immigration policy. At the same time,
national sovereignty in a liberal democracy ought to
encourage challenges by citizens to immigration policy.
78
A nation that is a constitutional democracy may especially
be expected to uphold its intrinsic values at the limits.
Liberals who take the political position that national
sovereignty forecloses questioning restrictive immigration
policies should acknowledge that they are diverging
VOLUME 7:2 1996
HeinOnline  -- 7 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 39 1995-1996
FRANK H. WU
greatly from their ideals. Better yet, they could return to
those ideals.
The best path back toward liberal ideals is viewing
immigration as part of domestic politics, looking at it from
the inside out, while also viewing immigration as part of
foreign policy, looking at it from the outside in.79
Exclusive use of the foreign policy perspective only
ensures that immigration will be likened to invasion.
80
Immigration issues have always fragmented political
parties and failed to divide neatly along the political
spectrum, 8' thereby demonstrating the inadequacy of
traditional labels and metaphors. Some conservatives
have argued in favor of immigration as an extension of
laissez-faire economic principles. They also have been
less sanguine about attacking "illegal" immigration, if not
actually tolerant of it. Their philosophy is based on an
opposition to welfare entitlements as a more important
problem (although with an apparent acceptance of the
notion that "illegal" immigrants take advantage of those
benefits and services as well).82
In this vein, William Bennett and Jack Kemp,
stalwarts of the Reagan and Bush administrations, placed
themselves among the opponents of Prop. 187. 83 Joining
them was California gubernatorial candidate Ron Unz,
who positioned himself to the "right" of incumbent Pete
Wilson in the 1994 Republican primaries; Unz opposed
Prop. 187 while Wilson served as one of its backers.
84
Aside from Bennett, Kemp and Unz, about the only
people whose arguments for unrestricted immigration are
taken seriously are pure libertarians who believe in free
markets and free movement of labor, unregulated by
government in any form.85 They may have the wrong
principle, but they do have a principle, which is better
than can be said of many others.
Brimelow may base his argument on race confused
with culture, but there are individuals who have legitimate
reasons for wishing to limit immigration.86 People ought
to be able to find a middle ground upon which to resolve
their disagreements. The challenge lies in finding that
place.
II. MEMBERSHIP HAS ITS PRIVILEGES
From an internal memorandum written by the founder of
the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR):
- on whites becoming a racial minority:
Will they simply go quietly into the night? Or
will there be an explosion?
- on the birthrates of whites compared to nonwhites:
Perhaps this is the first instance in which those
with their pants up are going to be caught by
those with their pants down. 87
The rush to close the gates - local, state and
national - is driven by several trends. These trends
shape the context within which any discussion of
immigration policy must take place. They form the
subtext of Brimelow's Alien Nation and lie beneath the
surface in many discussions of immigration policies. The
five phenomena are: (1) the changing role of whites in the
United States; (2) the changing role of the United States in
the world; (3) mass migration worldwide; (4) the
unimportance of being anywhere; (5) apocalyptic
predictions for the turn of the millennium. These social
and political forces, as much as any intellectual
arguments, generate nativism. Any legal response must
account for them.
A. Tim NEW FACE OF AMERICA
The first two phenomena are linked. The dramatic
demographic changes sweeping across the country have
become a cliched concept.88 The shifts in the balance of
power among nations have become perhaps equally
cliched.89 Together, these phenomena have created twin
trends of perceived decline. Some whites worry that they
will cease to be the dominant racial group in the United
States.9° Many Americans fear that the United States will
lose its position as the dominant superpower of the
world.9'
These acute anxieties are connected through
immigration. Brimelow and Buchanan make the
connection. As the latter has written, "Does this First
World nation wish to become a Third World country?
Because that is our destiny if we don't build a wall against
the waves of immigration rolling over our shores."92 Or as
one supporter of Prop. 187 put it, "People are saying, 'I
don't like this Third World takeover.' It is literally an
invasion and very upsetting."
93
The common complaint that "we" are becoming
"Third World" is ambiguous.94 The risk of becoming a
"Third World" nation refer both to an internal condition
and an external position. It is as rooted in the belief that
whites are diminishing in power as it is in the feeling that
the country is declining in influence.
These perceptions of change have the proverbial
grain of truth to them. 95 The nation has entered an
unprecedented phase in race relations, as a result of
immigration and intermarriage. 96  At the turn of the
century, the population consisted of approximately ninety-
percent nonHispanic whites.97 Before the turn of the
millennium, the population already consists of less than
seventy-five percent nonHispanic whites.98 The numbers
of immigrants in the population is higher than ever before,
but the proportion is lower than during the entire period
between the Civil War and the Depression." The number
of mixed marriages has doubled in the past decade.1
°°
Still, the grain of truth has grown into a weed of
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distortions and exaggerations: social science research
shows that white Americans, like all other Americans (to
different degrees), overestimate the extent to which
demographic changes have already occurred. 101
Until the relatively recent past, the country could
plausibly be mythologized as a unified community. In
fact, it was predominantly white racially and Anglo-Saxon
Protestant culturally. Today, the society could be
perceived as a mosaic of communities occasionally in
conflict. Regardless, it is undeniably multi-racial and
multicultural. Non-white racial groups and individuals are
increasing not only their numbers, but also their presence
and participation in economic, political and cultural
spheres. Coinciding with these changes, many citizens
have come to see the United States as a slowly sinking
lifeboat. 1 2
It is more than a coincidence though. Although it
would be simplistic to attribute resistance to immigration
solely to racism or nativism (or false consciousness on the
part of those immigrants who are less enthusiastic about
admitting others after them), it would be wrong to deny
that there is a complex relationship between efforts to
restrict immigration and the race of the immigrants. The
immigration debate is about the numbers of new arrivals,
but it also is about their races and their cultures.
B. ON THE ROAD TO NOWHERE
The third and fourth phenomena also are connected,
but in opposition to one another. Everyone is moving; or
more accurately, groups and individuals are more mobile
than ever before are mobile. Simultaneously, thanks to
technology it is increasingly irrelevant where a person is
located physically (if the person is well-situated
socioeconomically). These contradictory trends are
global as well as local.
Human migration may well be a natural and timeless
phenomenon. Individual mobility today is restricted by
abstract laws, rather than primitive territoriality, physical
barriers or practical constraints. According to recent
United Nations estimates, in 1985 there were over 100
million migrants throughout the world. 0 3 People depart
from their homelands destined for the United States, but
people leave for other nations as well - much of the
worldwide pattern of migration consists of movement
from developing nations to other developing nations.
1°4
Within overall migration patterns, another countertrend is
emerging which suggests the rise of a transnational class:
upwardly-mobile young Americans are working overseas
temporarily and settling elsewhere permanently.
05
In contrast with the compulsion to migrate,
individuals who have the means are able to rely on
technological advances and the integration of
communications to conduct their business affairs and
personal lives from almost anywhere. While a generation
ago media prophet Marshall McLuhan forecast a "global
village,"' °6 today Internet enthusiasts speak of the
forthcoming virtual community.1° 7 The Economist, the
cosmopolitan London-based newsmagazine that promotes
a libertarian philosophy, asked in a provocative cover
article, "Does it matter where you are?"108 The Economist
concluded that geography remains economically
important, but increasingly less so. 19
The sense that people are free of their physical
location, even if based more on optimism than fact,
presents a means of overcoming immigration
restrictionism. The divergent trends in the importance of
location are metaphorical as well: as Benjamin Barber has
observed, based on basic ideological conflict increasing
even as mass culture becomes more influential, "the planet
is falling precipitantly apart and coming reluctantly
together at the very same moment."'
10
C. APOCALYPSE Now
Finally, the fifth phenomenon presents itself as
overshadowing all else. The popular culture has been
inundated by a variety of neo-Malthusian doomsday
scenarios.l 1
The themes of overpopulation, overdevelopment and
overconsumption form the basis for an environmental
objection to immigration. The argument seems to be that
if everyone stays in place, people will lose their
opportunities to deplete natural resources and generate
waste - at least in the manner to which Americans have
become accustomed' 1 2 In his controversial book Living
Within Limits, Garret Hardin argues against allowing
migration from poorer to wealthier societies on biological
and ecological grounds.1 3 As a leading environmental
organization, the Sierra Club has published a book raising
similar claims.114 In doing so, it lent its reputation to the
cause of immigration restriction. By these means,
immigration restrictionists acquire scientific credibility
and liberal credentials.
Meanwhile, The Atlantic Monthly, an intellectual
mass media magazine that is moderate in its politics, has
published several cover stories in the past few years
describing impending chaos the world over and in this
country as well. The myriad predictions, all of them
negative, have been based on historical, social scientific
and scientific data. These articles, which have been well
received, have asked whether it "must be the rest against
the west;' ' 15 and whether the end of the world is near
because of breakdown of the social order,"
6
overpopulation," 7 or fundamentalism of many forms."
8
Such a bleak intellectual climate has fostered the growth
of anti-immigrant feelings.
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D. ThE COMMUNITY AS A COMMODITY
The five trends apply at all levels, local, state and
national. The similarity of the levels is as empirical as it
is analytic. Immigration and internal migration form
different levels of the same subject.
Migration crosses borders and borders within
borders. Here in the United States, internal migration has
always been the norm rather than the exception. The
levels of internal migration are so high that people who
move around within the country outnumber immigrants
coming into the country.
119
Coupling the positive myth of immigration with the
frontier myth, arrival in this country typically is only one
step in a long series of moves. 12° The local, state and
national levels also are connected through "white flight":
as nonwhite immigrants move to the specific regions of
the country, white natives move elsewhere within the
country. 121 One supporter of Prop. 187 displayed his
regional rather than national concerns by stating,
"Someone is going to be leaving the state. It will either be
them or us."
1 22
As people move across all forms of boundaries,
people react adversely at each of those boundaries.
Communities are becoming closed, in the local, state and
national spheres. At the local level, literal gates are being
built and closed around exclusive developments, some of
which are so large-scale as to be entire towns that have
been basically privatized. 123 At the state level, factions
within the Deep South have attempted to reassert a states'
rights movement, as a revival of antebellum traditions to
the extent of secession, though ostensibly free of their
racial components. 124 The aspirations of these local and
state movements show that the real risk of national
disintegration lies with whites, not Latinos. The local and
state developments mirror Brimelow's proposals for the
national border.
The resurgence of communitarianism as such has not
been tested legally, but some of its elements have faced
and failed constitutional scrutiny already. At a local level,
the Constitution has been interpreted to forbid official
decisions to physically divide communities by race. 125 At
a state level, the Constitution creates a right to interstate
travel that trumps official decisions to exclude migrants
because of economic status or assumed economic
status. 
26
There is no question that constitutional standards
exist for the control of local and state boundaries. 127 As
with all constitutional standards, these limits restrain
political actions that are supported by a majority, in this
case if they are based on racial or economic motivations.
Immigration law raises many of the same issues of
membership in the national community as arise at the
local and state levels. 128 However, immigration law at the
constitutional level differs from other border-related law
because it lacks guiding principles.
There was a time when immigration law was
animated by nativist principles. Before passage of the
1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, immigration
statutes had passed through phases when Eastern and
Southern Europeans were limited by strict quotas,
especially if their countries of origin were more heavily
Catholic or Jewish; Latinos were recruited as workers
when needed and repatriated when convenient; and Asians
were barred. 129 There was a time, too, when immigration
practices were integral to racist policies. Forced
migration of Africans as slaves, for all its scale and
severity, "the largest known migration over such a
distance in world history up to that time," 130 is usually
conspicuously absent from the stories of immigration.'
3'
All of that changed with the 1965 Act, which
established more or less neutral principles, by replacing
national origin quotas with hemispheric quotas. 132 The
1965 Act was imperfect. By imposing hemispheric caps,
it reduced permissible levels of Mexican immigration.
133
But it was revolutionary as a repudiation of a race-based
immigration policy.
In the post-1965 era, continuing minor alterations of
immigration policies have caused it to steadily drift away
from somewhat neutral principles. A series of political
bargains resulted in the programs allowing wealthy
investors to buy their citizenship,134 and the lottery that
provides players from designated countries with the
chance to win their citizenship. 135 In the best light, the
former suggests that people may earn citizenship, the
latter that they may be rewarded for their luck. Reflecting
the worst aspects of American culture, they might send the
cynical message that benefits are distributed as much by
luck as by work. Together, they are at odds with one
another, and not part of a cohesive public policy.
Perhaps appropriately, the highly technical substance
of the existing statutory scheme is weakened by its
convoluted procedure. 136 The immigration process is so
arcane as to benefit nobody except lawyers and con
artists. 137 The bureaucracy of the INS has been plagued
by scandals such as bribery.
138
Now, Prop. 187 and related proposals threaten to
return immigration policy to a pre-1965 racial basis.
Unlike in other areas of the law, the lack of principles
governing immigration policy assumes constitutional
dimensions because of the plenary power doctrine.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AS THE LAST REFUGE OF
THE SCOUNDREL
[Iln the exercise of its broad power over
immigration and naturalization, 'Congress
regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.139
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[01 ur country would be overrun by them.1
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A. THE HISTORY OF THE PLENARY POWER
DOcTRINE
Before considering the possible constitutional
analysis that could be applied to immigration, the sources
and weaknesses of the extraordinarily durable plenary
power doctrine must be revisited and explained. The
plenary power doctrine has enjoyed a long life for a
constitutional theory.14' The Constitution itself states no
more than that Congress, among its enumerated powers,
"shall have the power to... establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization."' 42 The Supreme Court has construed the
clause to mean that Congress has "plenary power" over
immigration if not immigrants, beyond constitutional
norms and judicial review.
1. The Anti-Asian Cases
The plenary power doctrine has its origins in cases
challenging race-based immigration restrictions which
formed the beginnings of federal immigration legislation.
The Court offered its interpretation of the doctrine in the
late nineteenth century in the course of upholding the
outright exclusion of Chinese immigrants. Since then, the
Court has continued to adhere to its view that it will defer
to whatever the federal legislature chooses to do with
respect to immigration. Normal constitutional review
vanishes.
The Supreme Court introduced the plenary power
doctrine in what is known aptly as the Chinese Exclusion
Case. In the case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States,143 the
Court upheld an 1888 Congressional act prohibiting
Chinese residents of the United States who had visited
China to return to the United States. 144 The 1888 act was
itself an amendment to the 1882 legislation that forbade
further Chinese immigration to the United States.145 That
earlier legislation, in turn, had been the political outcome
of a nationwide movement blaming Chinese immigrants
for an economic downturn.
Before the Exclusion Act, Chinese men had been
recruited to the Reconstruction South and in Northeastern
factories as laborers, and for work crews building the
transcontinental railroad. They were pitted against freed
black slaves and white ethnic minorities in an attempt to
replace those groups as a source of controlled labor,
especially as freedmen began to assert their rights and
unions began to organize. 146 During the time period
shortly before the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed,
Chinese communities were attacked by white mobs, with
dozens of fatalities in numerous incidents. 147
Significantly, the popular slogan used by anti-Chinese
forces was directed not only at immigrants but also at
residents: "The Chinese Must Go!'
' 48
The Chinese Exclusion Act and its later amendments
prevented further immigration, while also making it much
more difficult for those already within the United States to
travel overseas to see their wives and families. 49 With
the artificial absence of Chinese women in the United
States, along with miscegenation laws enforced by societal
norms, the Chinese American community would have died
out had the Exclusion Act been as effective as intended.
The racial motivations of the Chinese Exclusion Act
were unremarkable in the eyes of the Supreme Court. In
the Chinese Exclusion Case, Justice Stephen J. Field,
writing for the majority, identified the fundamental issue
as national sovereignty and not racial discrimination.
With that approach, he found the issue beyond debate.
That the United States government "can exclude aliens
from its territories is a proposition which we do not think
open to controversy." 150 He reasoned that this power was
derived directly from the principle of national sovereignty.
"Jurisdiction over its own territory.., is an incident of
every independent nation."'51  Otherwise, Justice Field
continued, the United States, "if it could not exclude
aliens.., would be to that extent subject to the control of
another power.' 152  The passage suggests that Justice
Field perceived the tension in the case as being between
the United States controlling its own borders, and
foreigners having power over the borders - the foreign
individuals involved in litigation coming to embody their
homelands. 153  Framed this way, the tension is not
between legislative choice and constitutional limits, as
represented by Congress and the Court, respectively.
Notwithstanding the importance of control over the
borders, Justice Field was somewhat ambiguous about the
extent of constitutional constraints on this power. He
provided a lengthy list of the "sovereign powers" - "to
declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel
invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republication
governments to the States, and admit subjects of other
nations to citizenship..." To this, however, he added
what might seem to be a constitutional caveat, that those
powers were "restricted in their exercise only by the
Constitution itself."'
154
The racialization of immigration law was explicit in
the Chinese Exclusion Act, but only implicit in the
Supreme Court case. While the Chinese Exclusion Act
singled out a racial group by name, the Supreme Court
assumed, without addressing the issue, that the power of
the legislature to regulate immigration included the power
to regulate it based on race. Insofar as the Court
considered race, it gave its approval to the Congressional
conclusion. The majority opinion asserted that "the
differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the
situation,"'55 in the decidedly unsympathetic sense that
"our country would be overrun by them"'56 without the
Exclusion Act. "The existence of war would render the
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necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and
pressing."'
15 7
The reasoning went straight from the reality of war
to the possibility of war to immigration: "The same
necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war
does not exist, and the same authority which adjudges the
necessity in one case must also determine it in the
other."'15 8 Whether the majority understood the war to be
literal or metaphorical, it understood the racial issue to
pose the risk of war and the risk of war to justify
exclusion. It is doubtful that Justice Field distinguished
much between a literal war - military invasion by
Chinese soldiers - and a metaphorical war - racial
invasion by Chinese immigrants.
A few terms later, the Supreme Court clarified its
theory in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.159 Much as
Chae Chan Ping is the Chinese Exclusion case, Fong Yue
Ting might be called the Chinese Deportation Case. In
Fong Yue Ting, the Court upheld another revision of the
anti-Chinese legislation, which specifically provided for
the deportation of individuals who by definition were
aliens unable to naturalize. 16° "The power to exclude
aliens and the power to expel them.., are in truth but
parts of one and the same power."'
161
Writing for the majority, Justice Horace Gray
expressed himself with even more conviction than had
Justice Field: "The Constitution of the United States
speaks with no uncertain sound upon this subject."'
162
Justice Gray limited judicial review to instances where "it
has been authorized by treaty or by statutes or is required
by the paramount law of the Constitution.' 163 Again, the
exception seems stronger than the rule, despite the
reference to the "paramount law of the Constitution."
Justice Gray concluded that "it behooves the Court
to be careful that it does not undertake to pass upon
political questions."'164 More than that, Justice Gray
recited another lengthy list of responsibilities entrusted to
the President. Harkening back to war, the list opened with
the President's role as "the commander-in-chief of the
army and navy." A similar list attributed to the Congress
began with its "power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations. ' 5 Within the powers attributed to Congress was
the power of "bringing of persons into the ports of the
United States."'166 With that line of reasoning, the Court's
authority was limited by the Constitution, but immigration
laws were not.
As with the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court
understood the Chinese Deportation case as raising no
racial issues worth considering. The statutory provision
that was challenged in the case was a requirement during
deportation proceedings that "at least one credible white
witness" attest to a Chinese individual's residency in the
United States prior to the enactment of the Chinese
Exclusion Act. 16 7 Far from evoking any concern about
unfairness, the racial discrimination was regarded as
reasonable. Congress had had experience with "the loose
notions entertained by the witnesses of the obligation of
an oath" when Chinese individuals were permitted to
testify. 168 Thus, the provision was an example of what
might be termed reasonable racism.
Writing in dissent, Justice David J. Brewer corrected
the majority's version of the facts: The Chinese
individuals were "resident aliens" and not sojourners
through the country and that they had been in the country
"almost as long a time as some of those who were
members of the Congress that passed this act of
punishment and expulsion."'169 Justice Brewer argued in
vain that "the governments of other nations have elastic
powers - ours is fixed and bounded by a written
Constitution."'170 Under that Constitution, it was improper
to "drive from our territory" people "for no crime, but that
of their race and birthplace. ' 'i 71
Presaging later developments in immigration law,
Justice Brewer distinguished the result reached in Chinese
Exclusion Case on what were to him "obvious" grounds.
The Chinese Exclusion Case had concerned immigrants
who were outside of the community - not people already
part of the community - and "[t]he Constitution has no
extraterritorial effect.' '172 Justice Brewer was not quite
progressive by today's standards, for he admitted in a
well-known piece of dicta that "it is true that this statute is
directed only against the obnoxious Chinese. ' '171 Justice
Brewer transformed his prejudice against the Chinese into
an appeal to universal standards of sorts, for he argued, "if
the power exists, who shall say it will not be exercised
tomorrow against other classes and other people?
' 174
Justice Field, who recalled that he "had the honor to
be the organ of the court in announcing" the earlier
Chinese Exclusion Case, numbered himself among the
dissenters in this later case. Introducing an argument that
has gone undeveloped in immigration law, Justice Field
argued that "the government of the United States is one of
limited and delegated powers" and the actions of expelling
the Chinese without due process of law exceeded those
powers.175
The language of the majority opinions in the two
cases appear almost to impose an affirmative duty on the
executive and legislative branches to protect the country
from foreign invasion, if only symbolic, by military action
if necessary and immigration laws in any event. The
plenary power doctrine, at this high point, goes well
beyond a limitation on the judicial branch. The plenary
power doctrine is asserted as a defense against a potential
racial war. When the court turned away from foreign
policy to domestic politics, the debate over the plenary
power doctrine focused on the division of authority among
branches of the federal government, or federalism
concerns over the allocation of authority between the
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federal government and the respective state
governments.17 6  Any discussion about the justice of
discriminatory restrictions against a racial minority never
began.
There would be nothing unusual about this judicial
attitude toward race in general and the Chinese in
particular, were it not for a decision the Court had issued
prior to either of the immigration cases but after the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 had already become the
law of the land. In the celebrated case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, the Supreme Court struck down a San Francisco
regulation of laundries that while neutral on its face had
been discriminatorily applied against the Chinese for
racial reasons alone.'" The case remains "good law" for
the proposition that a facially neutral law cannot be the
product of impermissible legislative intent, nor can it be
applied in a discriminatory manner.
178
In contrast to Yick Wo, the Chinese Exclusion Case
suppressed the racial references in the law. The
difference in the approach to immigration is all the more
striking because Yick Wo involved a statute that contained
no overt racial references while the Chinese Exclusion
Case involved a statutory scheme that consisted of nothing
but racial references.
This contradiction continued over time. As
immigration law evolved toward greater reliance on race,
the Court emphasized the irrelevance of race. If there
were doubts about the racial basis of an immigration law,
the Court resolved them as a matter barely worth comment
in dicta. In its 1903 decision of what is known as the
Japanese Immigrant Case, Yamataya v. Fisher,179 the
Court issued the pronouncement making explicit what had
been implicit: "That Congress may exclude aliens of a
particular race from the United States... and commit the
enforcement of... provisions, conditions and regulations
[for deportation] exclusively to executive officers, without
judicial intervention, are principles firmly established by
the decisions of this court.' 8 0 Appropriately, the Court
made its statement while applying constitutional due
process standards to deportation and holding that there
was no violation of those standards despite, among other
things, the plaintiff's inability to understand English, the
consequences of the proceedings, lack of assistance of
counsel, and denial of an opportunity to contest the
findings.1
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2. The Twentieth Century Cases
As a recurring theme throughout the nineteenth
century of immigration case law, the plenary power
doctrine has more recently been strangely submerged. 8 2 It
has receded from view without diminishing in influence.
Over time, though, it has lost complexity. Immigration
law has developed other peculiarities to be sure, but the
plenary power doctrine has become all the simpler.
At the turn of the century, the Court stated, "[O]ver
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete than it is over [immigration]."'
18 3
Since then, plenary power doctrine has continued to be a
set of stock citations bereft of further reasoning.
Over the latter half of the twentieth century, the
Court has continued to make similar statements about the
plenary power doctrine regardless of whether its decision
was favorable to the immigrant challenging a statute.
During the Cold War, for example, the nonidentical twin
decisions of Knauff and Mezei, each of which upheld the
exclusion of an alien with strong legal arguments
grounded in compelling circumstances, contained a
concise if facile statement of the view: "Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned."' 184
In that same era, immigration discrimination moved
beyond race to include ideology. In a concurring opinion
in the 1952 case of Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
185
concerning deportation of an individual for his
membership in the Communist Party, Justice Felix
Frankfurter recited the plenary power doctrine as follows:
"[Tihe underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall
be allowed to enter and what classes of aliens shall be
allowed to stay, are for Congress exclusively to determine
even though such determination may be deemed to offend
American traditions and may, as has been the case,
jeopardize peace.
186
Nearly one hundred years after introducing the
plenary power doctrine, the Supreme Court restated it. In
1972, the Court stated in Kleindienst v. Mandel8 7 that
"the Court's general reaffirmations of [the plenary power
doctrine] have been legion" and "[tihe Court without
exception has sustained [it] . . . .,,' In 1977, the Court
declared in Fiallo v. Bell:8 9 "at the outset, it is important
to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into
immigration legislation."'19 The Court wrote, "our recent
decisions have not departed from this long-established
rule."'191 The consequence, as the Court conceded freely,
was that "in the exercise of its broad power over
immigration and naturalization, "Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens."'
192
The majority approach adopted in Fiallo is the best
example of the plenary power doctrine retreating while
retaining its vitality. 93  There, the statute at issue
distinguished by legitimacy and gender: children born
within wedlock were treated better than children born out
of wedlock. Furthermore, the relationship of an
illegitimate child to the mother was recognized but not the
relationship of the same child to her putative father.
194
The majority reasoned that "it could be argued that the
line should have been drawn at a different point... [b]ut
it is clear from our cases that these are policy questions
,-VOLUME 7:2 1996
HeinOnline  -- 7 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 45 1995-1996
FRANK H. WU
entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our
government... ,195 Justice Thurgood Marshall
dissented, writing "this case, unlike most immigration
cases ... directly involves the rights of citizens, not
aliens."'196 He continued, "once it is established that this
discrimination among citizens cannot escape traditional
constitutional scrutiny simply because it occurs in the
context of immigration legislation, the result is virtually
foreordained.' 97
The majority's treatment of the dissent is
unresponsive. It purported to address the discriminatory
nature of the challenged provision, but overlooked the
type of discrimination that would be unconstitutional if
applied to citizens. The majority mischaracterized the
dissent of Justice Marshall as directed against any "line
drawing" among family members. The majority
responded in a footnote that "there are widely varying
relationships and degrees of kinship" and "in the
inevitable process of 'line drawing,' Congress has
determined that certain classes of aliens are more likely
than others to satisfy national objectives without undue
cost, and it has granted preferential status only to those
classes."'
' 98
The majority, by defending distinctions on the basis
of abstract family relationships which it did not further
specify, avoided the problem of discrimination on the
concrete bases of legitimacy and gender. Whether other
distinctions, such as those between immediate family and
distant cousins would be acceptable in domestic law, the
discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate
children, and mothers and fathers, are invidious and would
merit heightened scrutiny if enforced against citizens.
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The question remains, and the constitutional moment is
suspended, when the distinction is sanctioned in
immigration law. The problem is rendered especially
compelling because, even though the statute regulates
immigration, it is applied to and affects directly the
interests of citizens.
Recent decisions in the immigration area have not
presented a serious threat to the plenary power doctrine
because they have assumed its existence without
addressing its effects. The Court has decided a batch of
cases in the 1990s on immigration, none of which do more
with the plenary power doctrine than mention it: While
immigration issues have appeared on the docket
repeatedly, majority opinions have failed to criticize,
defend or even explain the plenary power doctrine.
2
W
The Court has been quiet about its chief analytic
principle in high-profile immigration matters. In the
politicized and publicized immigration litigation which
led to the Haitian Centers Council case, 2'° the Court
upheld an Executive Order that the Coast Guard
"interdict" boats on the high seas and turn away refugees
with colorable claims to legal immigration status. The
Executive Order, facially neutral, was directed at a
specific group of refugees - Haitians. 2  An
unprecedented form of immigration restriction, the
Executive Order also violated of the plain language of
international treaty obligations.2° 3 The Court held that the
federal government, through the executive branch, could
take official actions outside of the borders for the purpose
of preventing aliens from arriving on U.S. shores and
applying for legal status (along the way gaining access to
procedural due process protections). 2° 4  There is no
language in the majority opinion that would limit its
application to immigrants presumed to be "illegal" nor
which imposes any apparent limit on the extraterritorial
powers of the government over immigration.
As many observers noted, the Congressional Black
Caucus among them, the treatment of black refugees from
Haiti differed from the treatment of white refugees from
Cuba.205 Aside from race, the primary difference in these
situations were the ideologies of the regimes from which
they were fleeing - hardly a better basis for the different
treatment. 
2M
In reviewing the interdiction program, the Court
relied on the precedent established in Mezei.2°7 It did not
quite adhere to the plenary power doctrine. It did worse
than that. As Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued in
dissent, if the plenary power doctrine were applied, it
ought to have compelled the Court to choose the
Congressional policy expressed in the statute over the
Executive Order which disregarded it.208 Consequently,
plenary power proved to be of little use to immigrants on
the rare occasion when it would have favored them.
The only exceptions to the plenary power doctrine
that are likely to have any significance have been
identified by Hiroshi Motomura, building on work by
Stephen Legomsky. In a pair of law review articles,
Professor Motomura has reoriented the constitutional
dimensions of immigration law.
First, Professor Motomura has argued that
"phantom" constitutional norms have been developed by
the Supreme Court through statutory interpretation. 
2W
This tactic is illustrated by Jean v. Nelson.2 0 There, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, federal immigration
authorities, had discriminated on the basis of race and
national origin.21 1 The Court held that the challenged
parole statutes and regulations barred race and national
origin discrimination, and accordingly remanded for a
determination of whether the statutes and regulations were
being violated.21 2 It avoided altogether the much more
difficult issue of whether the statutes and regulations
could have been written the other way around.
Second, Professor Motomura has argued that lower
courts have sometimes avoided the plenary power
doctrine by characterizing a particular constitutional
challenge as procedural rather than substantive.213 This
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occurred in the vacated District of Columbia Circuit
decision on the marriage fraud sections of the immigration
statutes, Escobar v. INS.214 There, the court struck down
a two-year exile waiting period for naturalization that
applied when a marriage was entered into by an immigrant
while he was in exclusion or deportation proceedings.215
The court reasoned that the time period was a procedural
requirement, which in effect established an irrebutable
presumption of fraudulent marriage.
216
Together, as Professor Motomura argues, the two
approaches to immigration law give the Court a means of
evading constitutional concerns that are taken as central to
domestic law. The approaches create doctrinal
distortions. Where it denies right to immigrants, the Court
moves the border into the interior of the country.
In effect, instead of the border determining whether
an individual is an immigrant, whether an individual is an
immigrant locates the border. Other than a handful of
exclusion cases, immigration decisions rarely concern
individuals who are outside of the country at the time of
the events in question. Where it grants immigrants rights,
the Court divides laws pertaining to immigration itself and
laws concerning immigrants as individuals in a way
divorced from legislative intent and reality. That is,
Supreme Court case law can be reconciled as stating that
people have no right to immigrate, but immigrants have
rights as people.217 By ruling favorably for imnigrants in
cases that do not concern deportation or exclusion,218 the
Court has recognized that Congress is capable of
regulating immigration by regulating immigrants;
however, the Court has not noticed that Congress can
govern immigration directly with effects that are much
219more devastating.
Professor Motomura is not optimistic about the
potential for progressive reform through either statutory
interpretation or procedural approaches.m2° Nor is there
reason to be. The resurgence of restrictionist attitudes
toward immigration, and impending legislation lowering
levels of immigration with a possible racial motivation,
suggest that judicial willingness to extend civil rights
protection to legal immigrants (never mind illegal
immigrants) will not last long without constitutional
authority - if not constitutional mandate.
3. The Power of Stare Decisis
The plenary power doctrine is a relic. When the
Supreme Court decided the Chinese Exclusion Case, it
had yet to articulate any concept of strict scrutiny or
suspect classification. Accordingly, the judicial deference
to the legislative branch, and its accompanying lack of
interest in protecting the civil rights of racial minorities,
were normal and not anomalous for their time. They are
abnormal and anomalous today, though.
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
had not even propounded the color-blindness principle
that the conservatives of today would advance to give
meaning to the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme
Court had still to entertain the attack on racial segregation
presented in Plessy v. Ferguson,221 much less render its
ruling striking down separate-but-equal in Brown v. Board
of Education.222 Even a cursory review of Supreme Court
precedent turns up numerous concepts that commanded a
place in constitutional theory then but have been
jettisoned since: the notion that equal protection is "the
usual last resort of constitutional arguments" and that
forced sterilization of the disabled was progressive;223 the
natural law basis of gender discrimination;224 the idea that
political dissent could pose a "clear and present" danger
beyond First Amendment protection;215 the whole of
substantive due process;n 6 and the limits on federal
government authority pursuant to the commerce clause
(which also has since seen its resurrection). 227
The plenary power doctrine belongs to this same
company. Indeed, it has occupied a dubious place in
constitutional law since its invention. The Court itself has
recognized that 'much could be said for the view" that it
is ill-considered, "but the slate is not clean."'2
8
The stare decisis argument for the plenary power
doctrine is weak for three reasons. 229 First, stare decisis
can be best justified as a check on raw political power
shaping judicial decisionmaking. Its application is
appropriate where a reversal of precedent is urged
quickly. This is not such an instance. Second, the erosion
of the entire surrounding terrain of constitutional theory
leaves little support for this last remaining piece of
nineteenth-century racial case law. If the other doctrines
were rightly repudiated, so too the plenary power doctrine
should be "as application of constitutional principles to
facts as they had not been seen by the Court before."
' 30
The Chinese Exclusion case stands as a "decision [that]
has been proved manifestly erroneous" in its
characterization of Asian immigrants and "its
underpinnings [have been] eroded by subsequent
decisions of the Court." 231  Third, the plenary power
doctrine is an especially peculiar constitutional theory to
defend by the device of stare decisis. Stare decisis
protects the legitimacy of judicial review by insisting that
courts be bound by their decisions, but the plenary power
doctrine itself is an abdication of the function of judicial
review. To use stare decisis to defend the plenary power
doctrine is to persist in a refusal to take action. While
implicating constitutional concerns, as distinguished from
statutory interpretation, the plenary power doctrine has
also resulted in no private reliance that would counsel
against its reversal. 2
Not surprisingly, the plenary power doctrine finds
few defenders. Since its introduction, Supreme Court
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Justices have written strong dissents casting doubt on its
validity and wisdom.233  Generally, academics have
condemned it as a misguided gloss on the Constitution in
a "sustained shelling" of critical commentary 2 34 Nobody
is heard to contend that a contemporary counterpart to the
Chinese Exclusion Case, or other early decisions
following its plenary power doctrine, could or would be
decided with the same outcome or by similar reasoning.
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Ironically, there is nothing to the plenary power doctrine.
The powerful force it exerts is hidden. It preempts as a
constitutional matter almost any challenges on substantive
grounds to laws applicable to immigrants, certainly at the
time or place of their actual admission to the country, and
possibly in their later encounters with straightforward
discrimination.
Even for immigration restrictionists, including those
activists who espouse restriction for racial reasons, the
Supreme Court has done a frustrating disservice with
respect to the plenary power doctrine. The Court has
taken the worst possible course as an institution of final
authority in constitutional interpretation, by neither
overruling the plenary power doctrine, nor reaffirming it
with any analysis. If it intends to follow the plenary
power doctrine, the Supreme Court should say so. It
should declare that a renewal of the Chinese Exclusion
Act would be constitutional. It should be forced to
articulate its own institutional weakness and acknowledge
its willingness to countenance racial discrimination. If it
cannot do so, it has a responsibility as the arbiter of
constitutional boundaries to present an alternative.
B. THE FUTURE OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court could follow a better course.
The Supreme Court should abolish the plenary power
doctrine. The Constitution should apply to
immigration. 236 Aside from consistency, which, standing
alone, is less than compelling as a constitutional principle,
there are two primary reasons for applying the
Constitution to immigration. Both of these reasons have
been raised in the case law, but neither has been clearly
adopted by a majority of Justices.
1. The Potential of Citizenship
The first rationale for abolishing the plenary power
doctrine is a plain language reading of the text: many of
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution belong to
persons, not citizens.?3 7  Most importantly, the
Constitution prohibits the state from "deny[ing] to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."2 38 Alexander Bickel provided the leading analysis
of the constitutional importance of personhood and the
relative insignificance of citizenship.239 In a work which
would be characterized as more conservative than liberal
in conventional terms, Bickel traced the problems of
citizenship to "the contradiction of slavery." 0 According
to Bickel, because the Supreme Court's reasoning in Dred
Scott241 equated "people" with "citizens" in the course of
denying that blacks were either, the precedent "had to be
effectively, which is to say constitutionally, overruled by a
definition of citizenship in which race played no part."
2
After the Slaughter-House Cases2A3 rendered the Equal
Protection Clause more authoritative than the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, the reference to "persons" in the
former was elevated over the reference to "citizens" in the
latter.2 4
As the Court stated in Yick Wo before it had
announced the plenary power doctrine: '"he Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the
protection of citizens."245  Or as the Court has stated
almost a century after Yick Wo, 'There are literally
millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects every one of these persons from
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process
of law."
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Although its later pronouncement seems to offer
strong civil rights protection to persons without regard to
citizenship, the Court in that very case and on other
occasions has drawn a distinction with immigration that it
has withdrawn from elsewhere as a constitutional matter,
between rights and privileges.247 The Court distinguished
between participation in the political process and receipt
of governmental entitlements, protecting the right of
immigrants with regard to the former but not the latter
(presumably because immigrants could use the political
process to obtain governmental entitlements; maybe so,
but that reasoning would apply to any plaintiff in an
entitlements case). 248  The constitutional distinction is
reflected roughly in the political assertion by many
immigration restrictionists that the problem with which
they are concerned is not immigration itself but use of
public benefits. 249 The constitutional problem that must
be resolved is for the most part the right-privilege
dichotomy, and only to a lesser extent the citizen-
immigrant dichotomy.
Thus, the argument turns more on the level of
constitutional scrutiny that should be applied to
immigration laws than on whether there should be any
review whatsoever.250 A few aspects of applying the
Constitution to immigration should be clarified. The
change would necessarily be toward permitting challenges
to immigration laws that discriminated on the basis of a
suspect classification - aside from alienage - such as
race. Logically, the change could not be to allow
challenges to immigration laws that discriminated on the
basis of the ambiguous classification of alienage, as all
immigration laws inherently draw lines between citizens
and aliens.
251
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It may well be that immigration proponents would
relent on the citizen-alien distinction, and the Court would
approve alienage discrimination (including perhaps
discrimination against permanent resident aliens), if
discrimination on the basis of race in immigration were
established as unconstitutional3 2 In this sense, alienage
discrimination serves as a proxy for race discrimination.
53
After the change, alienage discrimination might become
permissible precisely because race discrimination vis a vis
immigrants would be prohibited. It would no longer be
possible for immigration restrictionists to work through
alienage to reach race, nor necessary for responses to
follow the same route.
Admittedly, immigration enthusiasts may not be of
one mind about the consequences of constitutional review
of immigration. There are approaches other than those
suggested here, but whatever path is followed is likely to
lead away from the makeshift devices that have developed
under the plenary power doctrine. 
2
The change fits well with mainstream constitutional
thinking: if an individual can easily alter the characteristic
(alienage), and it is not immutable, then it becomes much
more acceptable to use it as a classificatory trait 5s Any
change that provided greater protection for immigrants at
the border than they receive now need not necessarily
reduce the level of protection available to them after they
have passed within the borders3 6 The change, in sum,
would not require extreme results such as either open
borders or extending domestic standards beyond the
borders,257 although those more robust possibilities would
remain available as public policy options. 2
8
2. The Standing of Citizens
The Constitution itself - and civic culture as a
result - is strengthened if it is applied to immigration.
The commitment to the Constitution is affirmed by its
application to immigration; it will have positive ripple
effects on rights elsewhere.259 The converse also is true,
that the commitment to the Constitution is weakened by
creating an exception for immigration; that, too, has ripple
effects on rights elsewhere. Specifically, one of the
impacts of immigration legislation is on citizens who are
or are perceived as members of the same racial groups
that, as immigrants, are being excluded.26
In other words, the second rationale for abolishing
the plenary power doctrine is based on the rights of
members of the community, not outsiders to it: citizens
stand to benefit directly and indirectly from the proposed
change.2 1 As a practical matter, citizens and not aliens,
would become the likely primary plaintiffs in much of the
ensuing litigation. Citizens could challenge immigration
policies that, either facially or as applied, discriminated by
race rather than alienage.
Those laws that were intended to focus on race or in
operation did focus on race rather than alienage should be
flushed out. Laws of this type are of immediate Concern
to citizens who may be mistaken as immigrants -
particularly, as "illegal" immigrants - and disadvantaged
as a result. Consider the following scenario. High
proportions of the Asian and Latino population are
foreign-born. 262 The cultural stereotypes elevate the real
proportions. If Prop. 187 were to operate anything at all
like the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) -
and Prop. 187 is likely to be more harmful than IRCA,
because IRCA contained specific anti-discrimination
safeguards which Prop. 187 lacks - it would be
reasonable to predict that reasonable suspicion would
focus on Asians and Latinos who are citizens.3 Those
citizens should be allowed to sue under traditional
constitutional theories of race discrimination. 264
Although a survey of the citizen standing issue
lies beyond the scope of this article, there are immigration
cases in which citizens have been the co-plaintiffs, notably
in Fiallo and Kleindienst.35 These cases were failures for
the citizen standing approach, but lesser-known cases
have brought success to citizens and their immigrant
family members.
Earlier in the century, the Court invalidated the
California Alien Land Law - again facially neutral but
indisputably aimed at Japanese immigrants and their
Japanese American children - by analyzing part of it as a
case of citizen standing to challenge alienage
discrimination. 2' In the tradition of analyzing state
restrictions based on alienage in a federalism mode, the
Court wrote, "This case presents the conflict between a
state's right to formulate a policy of landholding within its
bounds and the right of American citizens to own land
anywhere in the United States."26 7 But then the Court
wrote, "When these two rights clash, the rights of a citizen
may not be subordinated merely because of his father's
[ineligibility for citizenship] .' ' 6
More recently, the Ninth Circuit has found that two
individuals met standing requirements when they brought
suit seeking injunctive relief in the form of a declaration
that they were citizens.269 The two plaintiffs had been
born outside of the United States to mothers who were
United States citizens and fathers who were foreign
nationals, at a time when the statutes conferring
citizenship on foreign-born offspring of citizens
discriminated between mothers and fathers; the children of
citizen mothers did not automatically become citizens, but
the children of citizen fathers did.270 The statute was
amended prospectively, leaving the plaintiffs no remedy,
short of their claim of an equal protection violation for the
failure to treat them like others similarly situated but
whose citizen parent had been male. The court found
standing and held for them on the merits. In its standing
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analysis, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs "have
suffered a concrete injury" and "their interests coincide
with their mothers and are equally as intense." 271 The
court mentioned that the plaintiffs' mothers were
deceased, but it did not rely solely or primarily on that
fact.
272
On the surface, the Ninth Circuit case may appear to
be the reverse of citizen standing. Below the surface, the
case is stronger than an affirmation of citizen standing. It
assumes that citizen standing would be permissible, if the
deceased mothers were to have been joined as plaintiffs.
It then goes further because it accepts not only standing
but also an argument on the merits from an immigrant who
is bringing the claim based on the rights of a citizen.
Citizens would also benefit indirectly, though
concretely, because of their family ties to immigrants.
The relationship of immigrant parents and their citizen
children were weighed in the balance in Plyler v. Doe,
273
where the Court applied rationality review and struck
down a Texas state law that prohibited children who could
not provide documentation of their status or their parents'
status from attending public schools. As already
discussed, the relationship of immigrant children to their
citizen parents failed to persuade a majority in Fiallo.274
This particular argument should have broad appeal.
Family "reunification" should be a prime example of
family values that cultural conservatives presumably wish
to encourage and the type of tradition and institution
communitarians believe need to be affirmed and
supported. 275 The connection between citizens and their
family members may serve to offset the tendency within
communities of color to impose internal distinctions that
disfavor immigrants among them. At the most theoretical
level, the citizen standing problem turns on the basic
question of who belongs to the community and can assert
her rights within it; denying citizen standing in
immigration matters means that members of the
community lose their ability to contest its norms.
3. The Limits of Limits
In the end, applying constitutional limits to
immigration would have relatively modest effects. 276 The
change would offer an opportunity to aggrieved parties to
challenge immigration statutes and regulations; it would
be far from an assurance that they would succeed in
litigation. The potential plaintiffs would face the same
extreme difficulties of any civil rights litigant under the
applicable doctrine.27 7 Following Adarand v. Pena,278 the
affirmative action case decided by the Supreme Court in
its 1994-95 term, suspect classifications may trigger strict
scrutiny, but strict scrutiny is not always fatal.279
As the Prop. 187 litigation continues through the
courts, it remains to be seen whether Plyler will remain
good law. Whatever the outcome of the new case, Plyler
remains a rarity: an immigration case where plaintiffs
prevail by demonstrating the irrationality of a statute
under the most deferential standard of review available.2
0
The anomalous status of Plyler underscores the
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, nature of the
likely results from applying the Constitution to
immigration. What would happen is as important as what
would not happen.
The most important positive result would be that
courts would strike down any restrictions based on a racial
rationale, in the same manner that a locality or state could
not rely on race to exclude individuals. They also
conceivably could strike down some, though by no means
all, restrictions based on a cultural rationale, to the
relatively limited extent that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments offer protection of cultural rights or may be
interpreted to do so in the future.28 The Chinese
Exclusion case, the source of the plenary power doctrine,
would be reversed, both as to the general principle and the
specific holding.282 In short, Brimelow's approach to
immigration could not be constitutionally legislated.
Neither race and culture, nor race and
socioeconomic status, should be equated with respect to
immigration any more than they can be collapsed as a
general matter. Brimelow's tendency to equate race and
culture would be problematic under constitutional
doctrine outside of the immigration area. Absent a nexus
that would satisfy strict scrutiny, race cannot be justified
as a classificatory device because of the asserted
difficulties associated with an individual determination
regarding culture.283  Individuals making the
counterargument that race and culture are not necessarily
the same sometimes serve as an example of their claim.
For example, Francis Fukuyama, who happens to be
Japanese American, is a leading neo-conservative working
within an historically Anglo-American tradition - though
without stated self-consciousness of the fact. 284
An equally important negative result is that courts
would apply the very deferential standard of rationality
review to limitations on immigration based on nonracial
factors. Essentially, these forms of discrimination would
285remain constitutional. As iconoclast Michael Lind has
proposed, we could have lower limits on immigration that
are race-neutral, along with strong civil rights protection
for permanent resident aliens. 286 Or as one sympathetic
reviewer of Alien Nation suggested, substituting class for
race, "We could easily have a much more discriminatory
immigration policy aimed at raising the average level of
human and financial capital of new entrants, while
maintaining the current, high proportion of non-
Europeans." 7 That these options would be permissible
as a constitutional matter does not mean that they would
be wise as a legislative choice.
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Most immigration restrictions based on economic
rationales would be left intact. Needless to say, the
economic impact of immigrants is important.288 However,
it bears emphasizing that similar considerations about
migrants cannot constitutionally be given full
consideration at local and state levels. Therefore, at the
national level, the proposed change to the plenary power
doctrine may be incomplete. Accepting some difference
between national and other borders might result in a
standard of review which permits economic factors to be
weighed against allowing immigration, provided that they
are not purely pretextual. If Congress were to provide an
economic basis for restrictive immigration laws, and a
plaintiff challenging the laws could not demonstrate that
the economic reasons concealed racial reasons, then the
plaintiff would need to carry the burden of regular
rationality review. Only a limited number of plaintiffs
would be able to meet that standard.
Again, what distinguishes the current doctrine is that
plaintiffs are precluded from even trying to show
irrationality much less invoking strict scrutiny. But as
Brimelow candidly concedes, "People habitually justify
their immigration preferences in economic terms, but
really they are motivated by a wide range of ethnic, moral
and even psychological agendas." 9 A covert version of
Brimelow's racial agenda would be equally
unconstitutional.
To take specific existing case law that would have a
positive impact if brought to bear on immigration, the
principle derived from Palmore v. Sidotti would prevent
prejudice from being used as its own justification.29° In
Palmore, the Court held that a white woman who was
living with a black man could not be denied custody of her
child from a former marriage on the basis of possible
prejudice against interracial relationships from the
community.2 91 The Court found unpersuasive the circular
argument that potential discrimination by the public at
large justified discrimination by the government - even if
the former prejudice could be proven.292 Likewise, under
the proposed reform, it would not be enough to save an
otherwise racially discriminatory immigration law by
arguing that a consensus supported it. The means would
not justify the ends.
Coming full circle, the Prop. 187 campaign
demonstrates the importance of constitutional standards
and judicial review. 293 In the campaign for Prop. 187,
proponents frequently argued that a vote in favor of the
measure would "send a message" without harming
anyone, because the courts would apply constitutional
safeguards. 294  Whether this was a blithe or cynical
assumption that constitutional limits applied to
immigration, sponsors of the measure complained after it
passed that judicial review would be undemocratic.
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C. IMMIGRATION AND OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS
Finally, there is important cultural meaning to
accepting immigrants as people within the protection of
the Constitution and immigration as an issue within the
purview of judicial review.296  Within constitutional
limits, immigration issues should be viewed as integral to
the civil rights movement - for Asian American and
Latino communities certainly, but for all racial groups in
some sense.297  Understanding immigration issues as
related to civil rights, if not understanding immigration
itself as a civil right, strengthens immigration rights as
much as it strengthens traditional civil rights. It enhances
the claim that civil rights are universal rights rather than
special interests. The current discussion of immigration
and civil rights has the relationship backwards.
Politicians of all persuasions have sometimes argued
against immigration on the grounds that it harms the most
disadvantaged native-born citizens. 29s Conservatives have
recently developed an especially potent strain of this
argument. Their inflammatory claim is that immigrants,
most of whom today are Asian and Latino, are taking
advantage of affirmative action, which was originally
meant for African Americans.29 This claim forms the
basis of the "blacks versus browns" dilemma.
300
Needless to say, the relationship between
immigration and affirmative action presents complex
issues. 301 To take examples from litigation, the named
defendant in the Adarand decision was a Latino member
of the Clinton administration Cabinet, 3°2 but the plaintiff
in a recent appellate case challenging affirmative action
also was Hispanic.30 3 Chinese Americans have challenged
the consent decree that desegregated the San Francisco
schools, 304 while an African American has challenged the
inclusion of Asian Indians in an Ohio affirmative action
program.305 Significant numbers of Latinos and African
Americans voted for Prop. 187 (though a lower proportion
than among whites).3 6 As these situations show, people
of color face great internal tensions - even over whether
they form any cohesive community within racial groups
before they build coalitions across racial groups. The
"blacks versus browns" dilemma creates as much as it
describes the situation.
Progressive individuals and communities, whether
people of color or whites, can and should address their
disagreements cooperatively and constructively. The
opposition of immigration and affirmative action,
however, divides communities with common interests in
civil rights and exacerbates their differences.
The opposition of immigration and affirmative
action serves political purposes.30 7 Its central claim is
curious if not paradoxical because it is used to attack not
only immigration, but also affirmative action. The two
issues - and respective racial groups who are represented
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T can be played off of one another only until one of them
gives way.
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1. What the Immigration Debate Tells Us About
Affirmative Action
The argument that immigrants should be excluded
from affirmative action, assuming it accepts that
immigrants are entitled to civil rights otherwise, implies
that affirmative action is an aberration, unrelated to civil
rights as a whole. The dynamics of immigration and
affirmative action may be difficult, and one or the other
may need public policy revisions, but the interplay
between the two deserves more careful consideration than
it has received.
The arguments for exclusion of immigrants from
affirmative action programs are self-defeating. The
argument that focuses on excluding immigrants because of
affirmative action presents the circular and paternalistic
logic that discrimination against racial minorities within a
society justifies their exclusion from it. The perverse
result is that efforts to remedy discrimination need never
include immigrants. Immigrants are deemed to have
consented to assuming a subordinate status.30 Some
politicians have gone so far as to suggest that immigrants
be barred for their lifetimes from receiving any
government entitlements, not only those with a race-based
component. 10
Brimelow himself would create a lower caste of
citizen. He objects that the citizens who sponsor
immigrants sometimes are not "native born" but
"immigrants who have simply graduated to citizenship."
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If he had his way, they would never effectively graduate to
citizenship, or having done so, would remain in significant
respects inferior to the native born. Immigrants would be
forced to sacrifice not simply allegiance to another nation,
but also the possibility of family reunification - that is,
the possibility of family reunification that would be taken
for granted by native-born citizens with respect to their
native nuclear families as well as their foreign-born
extended families. Accepting for the sake of argument
that this regime may be a defensible conception of
immigration, it is not so by any theory of liberal
democracy that allows immigrants to become citizens with
the implicit promise that the status once conferred will be
regarded in an equal and meaningful manner.
The racial arguments against immigration show the
emptiness of color-blindness. Color-blindness has content
only within its context.3M2 As the United States did for
several generations, a community could appear to be
color-blind among its members by the expedient means of
being highly color-conscious at the threshold. It would
exclude nonwhites from entry and membership.
Correspondingly, the Court can become color-blind
jurisprudentially by adopting a principle such as the
plenary power doctrine, which renders legislative color-
consciousness invisible. As a result, color-conscious
immigration policies would transform Justice Antonin
Scalia's recent pronouncement: "In the eyes of the
government, we are just one race here. It is American.
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The result is to equate being American with being
white, under the guise of color-blindness. Toward the end
of his book, Brimelow cautiously expresses goodwill
toward Asian immigrants because "[t]heir ethnic
message... may be different" than that of other non-
whites, thanks to the similarity of their beliefs to whites'
beliefs.314 Demonstrating knowledge of an obscure part of
American history, he recounts the arrival of Asian
immigrants "in the South directly after the Civil War."
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What Brimelow admires about these Asian immigrants
was that they "seem to have graduated.., in the era of
segregation, to a sort of honorary white status."
31 6
Brimelow likes them all the more because they further
graduated "to an actual white status" as "unreinforced by
immigration, the Chinese communities...
intermarried.., and essentially vanished from the Census
returns." 31 7 One may be in favor of assimilation - and
indeed quite assimilated - and regard this vision of what
it means to be a citizen as markedly inferior to the
promise held out by America.
The idea that some Americans have been here longer
and should have more power to determine who enters the
country rests on their racial ancestry rather than their
individual right.318 It is people as racial groups and not as
individuals who are presumed to have a greater stake in
American identity due to their lengthier presence in the
country. Under this theory, lineage, not longevity, is what
counts.
The immigrants and natives are groups which have
identities that survive over generations; if they are not
groups, it is difficult to see how an individual native could
demonstrate his "arrival" several generations prior to his
birth. One might optimistically believe that they could be
groups, without assuming that they are racial groups, but
given American history and Brimelow's "common sense,"
it is difficult to conceive of them as anything else. Hence
Brimelow's concern with his son and his appeal to
children collectively - or, rather, the children of the
white Founders of the Republic, and the children of
Brimelow's readership.
3 19
With a color-blind world view, it would be
nonsensical to state, as another leading restrictionist has
written: "racial justice means that the majority in a
country treats minorities fairly and equally; it does not
mean that the majority is required to turn itself into a
minority." 32° Even with a color-conscious world view, it
is not clear that racial justice is meaningful when people
of color must remain always and everywhere racial
minorities.
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The argument that immigrants from some nations,
but not other nations, have more in common with citizens
is Tooted in racial group generalizations. Even the
argument that newer immigrants are assimilating more
slowly than older immigrants rests on racial group
generalizations, as the conclusion is not reached on an
individual basis. Again, the reasonable response might be
something along the lines of, "well, yes, but we must make
some generalizations." This reaction fails to answer either
of the two questions it raises: why the generalizations
must be racial generalizations, and if they must be, why
they cannot be in other areas of the law.
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In immigration, it also becomes clear that
conservatives can recognize neutral standards that lack
invidious intent as having disproportionate impact in
practice, and that they can complain of the same. For
critics of immigration who hold racial concerns, the facial
neutrality of immigration laws is less persuasive than their
as-applied impact. The 1965 reforms, which were more
or less neutral standards, were passed with a mix of
intentions that was at worst benign toward whites and at
best (from the white perspective) favorable toward
whites.32
As Brimelow has argued, the neutral standards have
had an effect that is anything but racially neutral.32 Due
to migration patterns over which the United States has
little control (white Europeans from developed countries
have fewer incentives to emigrate) immigrants are
predominantly Asian and Latino. The critics of
immigration legislation are not assuaged by good
intentions and neutral language if the outcomes favor
Asians and Latinos. In response, Congress has adopted an
immigration counterpart to affirmative action, borrowing
the buzzword of "diversity." 324 The "diversity" lottery is a
visa quota based on national origin. It functions through a
set-aside of extra visas for countries that are
"underrepresented" within the immigrant pool, thereby
benefiting Europeans and Africans (the former
purposefully; the latter as a side effect) and for the most
part disadvantaging Asians and Latinos. 325 In 1995, for
example, 24,549 extra visas were allocated to Europe;
20,200 to Africa; 8 to North America; 2,589 to South
America; and 6,837 to Asia.
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Concern about immigration can be concern about
race. Peter Brimelow is right about that.327 If the public
is persuaded by Brimelow, and Asian and Latino
immigrants are deemed undesirable, it would follow that
Asian and Latino citizens also would be rendered less than
desirable.32 Though the latter may remain in the eyes of
many aliens within the community, there are constitutional
protections that should prevent their mistreatment. But as
what could not be done within the community is being
done at the borders, there is an undesirable impact within.
Asian Americans and Latinos are rendered perpetual
guests in their own country.
In this way, immigration issues illustrate the
tendency of conservatives, rather than liberals, to think
along the lines of racial group entitlement. Immigration
law presents the strong form of racialization of the law:
arguments based on race are not only permitted, they are
accepted as the norm; they are not only private beliefs, but
also embedded in public actions. Immigration shows the
weakness of color-blindness and intent-based approaches
to equal protection. While color-blindness conceals racial
motivations, an intent-based approach overlooks them.
Brimelow can agitate for racial restrictions, and
politicians may be persuaded but offer other reasons for
lower limits on immigration. Courts and commentators, in
their zealous watch for openly racial restrictions on
immigration, ignore programs with undisputed but hidden
racial motivations - such as the diversity lottery for
visas.
The success of efforts to limit immigration may
undermine the attacks on affirmative action.3 29  if
anything, the attempts to end immigration when it has
become predominantly colored show that color-blindness
is far from a universally shared ideal. The people who
would prefer immigrants who are racially Caucasian and
culturally Anglo-Saxon Protestant can hardly complain
about remedial programs such as affirmative action
because they rely on racial characteristics. They may
oppose the measures on other grounds, but the principled
claim of color-blindness is irretrievably undermined. The
concerns raised by the white majority with respect to
colored immigration carry over to affirmative action: it is
not procedural justice that is paramount, but resulting
substantive changes, not the number of people who are to
be allowed to enter, but their racial and cultural identity
and their political power that matters.
For those reasons, constitutional limits are critical.
Immigration is unique because the Court has recognized
that the Constitution is silent on basic facets of
government structure and federal power. The Court has
sought to interpret the text. Its mistake is in the specific
interpretation, not in the act of interpretation itself. The
arguments over affirmative action also show how
constitutional limits shape political outcomes. Alongside
the contentious debate on what affirmative action, if any,
is desirable, effective, or counterproductive, there is a
parallel constitutional discourse about what affirmative
action, if any, is required, permitted, or forbidden.
Whatever their position, virtually all participants in the
political process recognize that the public policy which
results is still bounded by constitutional norms. In this
way, constitutional theory informs and contributes to
political action; a civic culture is created which also is a
constitutional culture.330 We are creating a constitutional
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culture; our immigration laws can contribute toward that
constitutional culture, rather than contradicting it. The
constitutional constraints can and should be flexible, but
they must exist if there is to be a more deliberative
democracy and principled political choices.
2. What the Affirmative Action Debate Tells Us About
Immigration
The rhetorical similarities between anti-immigrant
and anti-affirmative action campaigns emerge in the
juxtaposition of Prop. 187 with the cleverly misnamed
California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI)331 - the anti-
affirmative action referendum that will follow it in the
1996 elections. Prop. 187 and CCRI share something
pernicious. Each contains an appeal to racial minority
groups at the expense of other people of color.
3 32
Perhaps the most galling aspect of the Prop. 187
campaign was the false promise made to African
Americans. 333 Without evidence, advocates for Prop. 187
asserted loudly and repeatedly that Asian and Latino
immigrants were taking jobs from blacks or using
government services intended for underprivileged citizens.
Backers of Prop. 187 implied that excluding Asians and
Latinos from the country would benefit blacks directly.
What was never mentioned is that there were no plans to
spend the purported savings from passage of Prop. 187 on
either creating employment opportunities for blacks or
increasing benefits for the poor.
In an almost perfect reversal,334 CCRI is targeted at
the rapidly growing and increasingly powerful Asian
American community.335 Proponents of CCRI argue to
Asian American audiences that they are limited in their
upward mobility because African Americans receive racial
preferences. In particular, the argument goes, Asian
Americans stand to gain greatly in their representation on
college campuses if African Americans and Latinos are
excluded. What is never revealed is the practice of
affirmative action for whites in the form of preferences for
alumni children or outright quotas for whites such as at
the prestigious Lowell High School in San Francisco.
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Taken together, Prop. 187 and CCRI send the
message to racial minority groups that they must compete
for the crumbs left on the table after the pie has been eaten
by the majority. They also send the message that political
problems should be solved by blaming them on parts of
the population traditionally seen as outsiders. Moreover,
Prop. 187 and CCRI implicitly urge racial minority groups
to turn upon themselves. Asian and Latino immigrants
and African Americans who have assimilated, prospered
and moved to the suburbs are welcomed as good
minorities. The others become the "illegal" immigrants
and the "unqualified" who are to be left behind.
It is important to note that one can be ambivalent
about immigration and affirmative action, but also be
appalled at the disingenuous and manipulative manner in
which they have been bound together. It is possible to
oppose immigration without being "racist," however that
term may be defined. The more important inquiries,
politically and constitutionally, look beyond blame and
intent, good intentions and bad faith; victims and
wrongdoers; they are directed, instead, toward identifying
the real economic and structural problems - and possible
solutions to them. Along the way, though, individuals
who are concerned about justice in immigration would do
well to ask themselves whether they believe what they are
being asked to believe about immigrants. All of this is to
point out contradictions in the immigration restrictionist
position when it is asserted with an anti-affirmative action
position; none of this should be taken to suggest that
increased color-consciousness, in a conventional sense, is
required or preferable.
In the volume of cases and the contentiousness of the
decisions, immigration law has developed as a leading
field for development of constitutional theory.33 7 This has
occurred despite the persistence of the plenary power
doctrine. It may well be that the plenary power doctrine
has been weakened over time, but the current legislative
proposals are likely to bring its return with a vengeance.
Even if it were considered moribund, it is far from certain
what if any norms have taken its place. The plenary
power doctrine has distorted constitutional discourse, by
excepting an entire area of law from normal review.
Major immigration cases that presented an opportunity to
overturn the plenary power doctrine have been settled,
which, while beneficial to the litigants, has prevented the
development of standards favorable to all immigrants.338
If the Supreme Court is unwilling to impose constitutional
limits on Congress, the legislature will have the
opportunity to assert its independent role in evaluating the
Constitution by adopting a more moderate course in
immigration reform.
One last caveat is in order. Contrary to their
references to reason, immigration restrictionists have
employed a galling strategy which should be resisted.
That ad hominem strategy is the characterization of
advocates of liberal immigration policies as motivated
merely by bias due to their own personal circumstances,
and able to argue only in emotional terms as a
consequence. 339 The same could be said of proponents of
conservative immigration policies - who would be as
adamant, if not outraged, if their right to take part in the
political process were denied and their right even to
remain in the country of their birth denigrated.
Immigration enthusiasts have as much of a claim to the
national interest.
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CONCLUSION
The change proposed here would bring to the
immigration debate the limits which are recognized in
every other sphere of American law. In the face of
contested normative judgments, whether immigration is
racially desirable or not, and disputed facts, whether
immigration is economically beneficial or detrimental, the
Constitution should mark the limits of the law. It is
commonplace to suggest that the treatment of strangers
reveals most deeply the morality of a society. It would be
remarkable if the treatment of its potential members
reflected as well the confidence of a society.
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90-101 (1994).
60I encountered these arguments while working on the
campaign against Prop. 187. Some of the difficulties faced by
liberal candidates during the Prop. 187 campaign are discussed
in Greg Krikorian & Amy Wallace, Prop. 187 Rises as Key
Theme In Top 2 Races, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1994, at Al; B
Drummond Ayres, Jr., The 1994 Campaign: California:
Candidates Hedge Their Bets on an Immigration Measure, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1994, at B8.
61 Koh, supra note 2.
62 My article may be read as a dialogue with and extension from
Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open
Borders, 49 REV. OF PoL. 251, 264-70 (1987) [hereinafter
Carens, Open Borders] (the essay is a contemporary classic in
its articulation of the open borders argument, considering
Nozick, Rawls and Walzer). Carens is concerned with the
universal nature of liberal values. Id. at 265, 269. Carens also
argues that the national, state and local borders are comparable.
Id. at 258, 266-67. See also Joseph H. Carens, Immigration and
the Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 207
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1988).
For a recent version of the open borders argument, see R.
George Wright, Federal Immigration Law and the Case for
Open Entry, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1265 (1994); see also ALAN
DowTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (1987) (discussing right to emigrate as
well to immigrate, using international perspective); contra
Whelan, supra note 56, at 27.
63 In developing my legal analysis, I have been guided most by
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter
Motomura, Plenary Power] and Hiroshi Motomura, The
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates
for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625
(1992) [hereinafter Motomura, Curious Evolution]. I also have
been aided by the following law review articles on immigration
policies: T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Rights - Here and There:
Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 A.J.I.L.
862 (1989); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens,
Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9
(1990) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Citizens]; Louis Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853
(1987); Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and
Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and
Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL.
L. REv. 863 (1993); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986);
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of
Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255
[hereinafter Legomsky, Plenary Power]; STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY - LAW AND
POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (1987); Gerald L. Neuman,
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) [hereinafter Neuman, The Lost
Century]; Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE
L.J. 909 (1991); Jamin Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens:
The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of
Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PENN. L. REv. 1391 (1993); and Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
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REv. 1 (1984). One of the few articles analyzing immigration
within a comprehensive constitutional framework is Michael J.
Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060-65 (1979) (analysis
of immigration legislation as preemption problem rather than
equal protection issue). Cf Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection
of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National
Government, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. 275; LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 361 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
positivist theory of national sovereignty as unrealistic), 1544-53
(analyzing alienage discrimination cases within equal protection
theory and characterizing Plyler as the right result but
"problematic" in reasoning). Additional articles are cited
throughout.
6 I hasten to emphasize this point: my concern is with racial
motivations for lowering the numbers of immigrants or selecting
them. I am concerned about cultural arguments as well, but only
insofar as culture masks race, or culture is protected within
domestic constitutional standards. I am not concerned with
economic arguments, except to note that they, too, may be
economic arguments only on the surface and something else
altogether below the surface; as discussed throughout the notes,
the empirical evidence for an objective argument against
immigration is weak.
65 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 2 (mayor of Culver City supports
military on border); Bunting, supra note 59 (Democratic Senator
from California supports military on border).
6 See, e.g., Dwight Silverman, Buchanan Backs Barrier on
Border with Mexico, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 12, 1991, at Al
(quoting Presidential candidate Pat Buchanan as advocating
building a "ditch and fence" on U.S.-Mexico border).
67 Michael J. Nunez, Note, Violence at Our Border: Rights and
Status of Immigrant Victims of Hate Crimes and Violence Along
the Border Between the United States and Mexico, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 1573 (1992) (describing Border Patrol and vigilante
violence); Jerry Kang, Note, Racial Violence Against Asian
Americans, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1926 (1993) (discussing
racialized violence against Asian Americans).
68 See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (no need to
reach constitutional issues possibly presented by detainees who
may have been excludable, because of statutory ground for
decision).
69 Cf. Aleinikoff, Citizens, supra note 63, at 33-34 ("But our
immigration laws are not primarily concerned with the
construction or maintenance of a particular kind of
community"); contra WALZER, supra note 56, at 35-42
(considering analogies for the nation).
70 The use of the term "Americans," rather than U.S. citizens is
intentional. Brimelow uses the term to mean U.S. citizens; and
U.S. citizens tend to view themselves as "Americans" to the
exclusion of Canadians, Mexicans and others in the Western
Hemisphere. I am sensitive to the claim that just as American
does not mean white, it also does not mean U.S. citizen.
71 Carens, Open Borders, supra note 62.
72 In an historical reflection of the equivalence between federal
and state immigration restriction, Professor Gerald Neuman
discusses the 1803 federal statute that forbade importation of
foreign blacks into states whose laws contained the same
prohibition; he suggests that the congruence at federal and state
levels "may hereafter occupy a prominent place in the history of
our legislation." Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 63, at
1869-70. Neuman is a notable exception in that he clearly links
slavery-related anti-immigrant legislation directed at blacks with
other anti-immigrant legislation such as the Chinese Exclusion
Act. Id. at 1872.
The normative arguments made in this article do not
depend on the romanticized notion that the nation had "open
borders" in the past. See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note
63 (describing numerous state statutes and regulations
governing immigration and immigrants prior to the Chinese
Exclusion Act).
73 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 4,
89-95 (1980) (describing rationality principle whereby
"whenever anybody questions the legitimacy of another's
power, the power holder must respond not by suppressing the
questioner but by giving a reason that explains why he is more
entitled to the resource than the questioner is" and imagining
dialogue in which native defends right to exclude immigrant
based on earlier arrival). Ackerman would tolerate limits on
immigration if they were necessary to ensure the "liberal
dialogue." Though this may prove to be a dangerous exception,
susceptible to claims of crisis, it at least indicates that Ackerman
cannot be dismissed as an absolute proponent of open borders.
74 See WALZER, supra note 56, at 34 ("there are certain
similarities between strangers in political space (immigrants)
and descendants in time (children).").
7 5 See, infra note 318 and accompanying text.
76 Or as Louis Henkin stated, "[t]here is no reason to resist...
[the] suggestion that control over immigration is a right of every
sovereign state and that it is inherent.. ." Henkin, supra note
63, at 857.
77 National sovereignty is invoked often and uncritically as
"directly" justifying immigration policies. See, e.g., Peter H.
Schuck, The Message of 187: Facing Up to Illegal Immigration,
21 AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1995, at 85, 88 (1995) (arguing that
"harsh options" for illegal aliens "follow directly from the
premise of national territorial sovereignty.").
78 Carens, Nationalism, supra note 56, at 49, 54 (distinguishing
between arguments made by outsiders and insiders).
79 For the latter view, see, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick & William M.
Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of International
Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH.
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L. REv. 589 (1995). See also THREATENED PEOPLES,
THREATENED BORDERS, supra note 15 (proceedings of the
American Assembly at Columbia University), especially at 13
(immigration "has created a major foreign policy challenge to
the United States and other population-receiving countries") and
299 ("international migration is rising to the top of the foreign
policy agenda."). The concluding recommendations of the
American Assembly, which include the use of "domestic policy
instruments" to control immigration, omit any mention of
constitutional norms. The legal version of this view is found in
justifications of the plenary power doctrine based on the foreign
affairs power, the war powers, or the commerce power (with
respect to commerce with foreign nations). A useful summary
of the different justifications offered for the plenary power
doctrine can be found in ALEmNIKOFF, supra note 13, at 7-15 and
Legomsky, supra note 63, at 261-78.
so See Carens, Open Borders, supra note 62, at 271.
81 On the side that supports immigrants, former New York
Governor Mario Cuomo, a leading Democrat, and current New
York City mayor Rudolph Guliaiani, a law and order
Republican, have been willing to extend their welcomes to legal
immigrants together with undocumented immigrants. See
Michael S. Teitelbaum & Myron Weiner, Introduction, in
THREATENED PEOPLES, THREATENED BORDERS supra note 15, at
20.
For examples of contemporary divisions on immigration
issues, see Steven A. Holmes, The Strange Politics of
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, § 4, at 3; Matthew
Purdy, Unlikely Allies Battle Congress Over Anti-Immigration
Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at BI; Choi, supra note 4.
8 2 By and large, contrary to the premise of Prop. 187,
immigrants do not immediately enjoy the same entitlements as
citizens; this is all the more true of "illegal" immigrants. Legal
immigrants underutilize benefits and services to which they are
entitled, with the possible exception of elderly refugees whose
immigration to the United States arises from unique
circumstances - in many cases a result of U.S. foreign policy.
On legal immigration and welfare, see Richard A. Boswell,
Restrictions on Non-Citizens' Access to Public Benefits: Flawed
Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1475, 1482-
87 (explaining virtually absolute discretion of United States
embassies in denying visas to applicants deemed likely to
become "a public charge," citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(4) (1994)).
On "illegal" immigration and welfare, see Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42
UCLA L. Rev. 1453, especially 1468-70 (1995) (discussing
principles that might be used to "draw the line"). For empirical
data concerning the use of government entitlements, see FIx &
PASSEL, supra note 58 (concluding that immigrants, legal and
illegal, create a net economic gain); JULIAN SIMON,
IMMIGRATION: THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTS (1995).
83 See Ronald Brownstein & Patrick J. McDonnell, Kemp,
Bennett and INS Chief Decry Prop. 187, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1994, at Al.
See Ron K. Unz, Immigration or The Welfare State; Which Is
Our Real Enemy?, HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y REv., Fall 1994, at
33 (arguing for higher immigration levels but reduced
entitlements).
8 See Choi, supra note 4.
861 take racial considerations to be "illegitimate," because they
generally are considered to be illegitimate by the common
culture and constitutional doctrine with respect to local and state
borders. I am willing to concede the argument, at least in this
Article, to anyone who takes both the position that Brimelow is
right and the position that racial considerations are morally
legitimate with respect to the internal borders of a liberal
democracy.
87 ELLIS COSE, A NATION OF STRANGERS: PREJUDICE, POLITICS
AND THE POPULATING OF AMERICA 194 (1992). Brimelow refers
to the founder of FAIR rather frighteningly as "truly a citizen
who has taken up arms for his country." BRIMELOW, supra note
6, at 278.
88 See, e.g., William A. Henry II, Beyond the Melting Pot,
TIME, Apr. 9, 1990, at 28; Tim Mathews et al., America's
Changing Face, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1990, at 46; Special Issue
(Multiculturalism), TIME, Fall 1993; Felicity Barringer, Census
Shows Profound Change in Racial Makeup of the Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1991, at Al; Edward B. Fiske, Minorities a
Majority in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at B1;
Martha F. Riche, We're All Minorities Now, AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1991, at 26; Barbare Vobejda, Births,
Immigration Revise Census View of 21st Century U.S., WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 1992, at A10 (reporting that whites would become
a racial minority group faster than expected because of
comparatively lower birth rates). See generally SAM ROBERTS,
WHO WE ARE: A PORTRAIT OF AMERICA BASED ON THE LATEST
U.S. CENSUS 65-117 (Rev. ed. 1995); Fix & PASSEL, supra note
58, at 25-28, 39-44, 70-71; Jeffrey S. Passel & Barry
Edmonston, Immigration and Race: Recent Trends in
Immigration the United States in IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIcrry:
THE INTEGRATION OF AMERICA'S NEWEST ARRIvALs 34 (Barry
Edmonston & Jeffrey S. Passel eds., 1994) [hereinafter
IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICrrY].
89 The 21st century has been described as 'The Pacific Century."
See, e.g., FRANK GIBNEY, Trm PACIFIC CENTURY: AMERICA AND
ASIA IN A CHANGING WORLD (1992); Special Report, The Pacific
Century, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1988, at 42; James A. Baker, III,
Just What Should the Role of the United States Be in the Pacific
Century?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, at M2 (former Secretary
of State arguing that the United States can and should play an
active role in the Pacific Century).
90 See BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at 62-65, 72-78, 137, 191-201.
91 For an influential statement of the view that ideological
conflict among nations would increase in the next century, with
many countries set against the United States, see Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer
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1993, at 22.
92 See Stephen Glass, Pat Speaks, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 18,
1996, at 17.
93 Sam Enriquez, Valley Chambers Vote to Support Prop. 187,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1994, at Al.
94 Supporters of Prop. 187 repeatedly referred to the 'Third
World" in derogatory terms. See Kevin R. Johnson, Public
Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration
Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509,
1548 n.178 (1995) (describing views of Prop. 187 supporters,
including negative references to "Third World" origins of
immigrants) [hereinafter Johnson, Public Benefits]; Kevin R.
Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular
Democracy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political
Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV.
629, 654-58 (same) [hereinafter Johnson, Race]; see, e.g., Gebe
Martinez & Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Backers Counting
on Message, Not Strategy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at Al
(quoting supporter as stating that "We are becoming a Third
World state.").
95 Some of the issues related to these perceptions are discussed
in Hing, supra note 63; Karst, supra note 63; and Frank H. Wu,
Changing America: Three Arguments About Asian Americans
and the Law, AM. UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
96 Of course, the nation has never been wholly white, or even
simply black and white. ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 73.
Differences among white ethnic groups were considered
significant until relatively recently. See MICHAEL NOVAK, THE
RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS: POLITICS AND CULTURE IN
THE SEVENTIES (1972); see also HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE
LAND, supra note 13; NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME
WHITE (1995).
97 ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 67.
91 Id. at 70.
9 See SIMON, supra note 82, at 7-10; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE
FOREIGN BORN POPULATION: 1994 (1995).
I") Mixed marriages constitute two percent of all marriages.
Some of the apparent increase over time may be due to better
survey methodology. See ROBERTS, supra note 91, at 48. See
also FIX & PASSEL, supra note 58, at 43; Antonio McDaniel,
The Dynamic Racial Composition of the United States: An
American Dilemma Revisited, DAEDULUS, Jan. 1995, at 179
(comparing intermarriage rates of African Americans with
intermarriage rates of Asian Americans).
'(1 See Richard Morin, A Distorted Image of Minorities; Poll
Suggests That What Whites Think They See May Affect Beliefs,
WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at Al.
102 See Adler & Waldmann, supra note 4. Although I am
skeptical of the distinction, arguably racism and nativism are
diverging, and presumably most clearly among immigrants who
oppose immigration. Their views, which warrant further
consideration, appear to be among the least persuasive
arguments to immigrants who disagree but also the most
persuasive for natives who agree. Derrick Bell's analysis of the
"super-standing" acquired by racial minorities who espouse
conservative political views may explain this dichotomy. See
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 109-26
(1992).
103 See Sharon S. Russell, Migration Patterns of U.S. Foreign
Policy Interest, in THREATENED PEOPLES, THREATENED
BORDERS, supra note 15, at 41 (citing UNITED NATIONS, TRENDS
IN THE TOTAL MIGRANT STOCK (database)). See also Hal Kane,
Leaving Home, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1995: A WORLDWATCH
INSTITUTE REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE
SOCIETY (Lester R. Brown ed., 1995) (general overview of
worldwide migration patterns).
104 Only 16% of migrants can be found in the United States.
Russell, supra note 103, at 41. To be fair, 33% of migrants to
the developed world resided in the United States. Id. The
United States is also unique within the developed world in
experiencing increasing immigration in the past generation. Id.
at 45.
105 FIX & PASSEL, supra note 58, at 23; Passel & Edmonston,
Immigration and Race, supra note 88, at 34-36; William
Echikson, Young Americans Go Abroad To Strike It Rich,
FORTUNE, Oct. 17, 1994, at 185; Gary Belsky, Escape from
America, MONEY, July 1994, at 60. Fix and Passel, who are
based at the Urban Institute, estimate 200,000 American
emigrants annually. FIX & PASSEL, supra note 58, at 23.
106 See MARSHALL McLUHAN, THE GLOBAL VILLAGE (1968).
107 See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY:
HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1994).
108 Editorial, Does It Matter Where You Are?, ECONOMIST, July
30, 1994, at 13. The editorial was accompanied by a special
section on technological changes.
19 Id.
110 Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, ATLANTIC, Mar.
1992, at 53. The article has recently been expanded into a book
of the same name.
111 See, e.g., Nick Ervin, Immigration and the Environment, in
ARGUING IMMIGRATION, supra note 3, at 90. See generally Peter
L. Reich, Environmental Metaphor in the Alien Benefits Debate,
42 UCLA L. REV. 1577 (1995). Cf. JULIAN SIMON, THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 187-93 (1989)
(arguing that immigration has not harmed the environment). The
following section is developed from the Reich article.
112 Reich, supra note 111.
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author of the famous essay, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 142 (1968).
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AMERICANS? POPULATION, IMMIGRATION AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1994).
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and Developing Nations, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1994, at 61, 69
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number of poverty-stricken, resource-depleted nations whose
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proposing a global New Deal).
116 Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity,
Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly
Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet, ATLANTIC, Feb.
1994, at 44 ("Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime,
scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion
of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment
of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels
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book. ROBERT D. KAPLAN, Tna ENDS OF THE EARTH: A
JOURNEY AT THE DAwN OF THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1996).
117 Charles C. Mann, How Many is Too Many? Population
Growth, ATLANTIC, Feb. 1993, at 47 (describing history of
overpopulation studies and contrasting biological-ecological
with demographic-economic approaches; concluding that there
probably is a problem with overpopulation).
118 Barber, supra note 110.
119 ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 114 (more than half of the
population changed residences between 1985 and 1990); Fix &
PASSEL, supra note 58, at 29-30 (reporting that between 1985
and 1990 New York City gained 600,000 immigrants but lost
800,000 natives for a net population reduction); Steven A.
Holmes, Now, Home Is Where the Job Is, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1994, § 4, at 3. Cf SIMON, supra note 111, at 15-17.
12 BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at 68-70. Brimelow recognizes
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the arrival of nonwhite immigrants. See Kristin E. Neuman &
Martin Tienda, The Settlement and Secondary Migration
Patterns of Legalized Immigrants: Insights from Administrative
Records, in IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY, supra note 88, at 184-
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121 See BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at 68-70.
122 Martinez & McDonnell, supra note 94.
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State's Rights Shall Rise Again, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1995, at
C3 (statement from leaders of secessionist Southern League);
SOUTHERN PARTISAN, Fourth Quarter 1994, at 34 (interview with
Michael Hill, leader of the Southern League).
125 See Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (holding that
segregation at a local level is unconstitutional but rejecting
challenge to the building of a public wall separating
predominantly black and predominantly white areas for lack of
showing of intent). For scholarly commentary on the case, see
Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography
in Legal Analysis, 107 HARTv. L. REV. 1841 (1994); Charles R.
Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987). There also are Fair Housing Act protections and other
statutes that forbid and attempt to ameliorate residential
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126See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969)
(recognizing right to interstate travel without attributing it to a
specific Constitutional clause, in considering a challenge to state
welfare restrictions); Anderson v. Greene, 115 S. Ct. 1059
(1995) (declining on ripeness grounds to consider merits of
challenge to California welfare entitlements differential between
long-term residents and new incoming residents).
127 The Supreme Court has occasionally compared impairment
of the right to interstate travel with discrimination against
immigrants. In one of its decisions most favorable toward
immigrants, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the
Court unanimously struck down state public assistance
provisions that discriminated against noncitizens, citing Shapiro
v. Thompson throughout the opinion. Whatever these decisions
meant, they were limited by the later decision in Mathews v.
Diaz. 426 U.S. 67, 85, 87 (1976). Although emigration is
different than immigration, and temporary travel overseas
different further still, see Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 241
n.25 (1984) (upholding limitations on international travel by
citizens, stating that earlier cases had treated "the constitutional
right to travel within the United States and the right to travel
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based policy. Actually, even national origins have been reduced
to race in immigration law. Prior to the 1965 reforms, the
Second Circuit held that a Brazilian citizen born of Brazilian
parents of Japanese ancestry was not Brazilian, but Japanese for
quota purposes. Hitai v. INS, 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965).
The increasing divergence of national origin and race,
even in what might be regarded broadly as the Old World,
exposes the constructed and indeterminate nature of the
concepts - when there are enough individuals who are, say,
Arab or African racially, French as a matter of national origin
and citizenship, and some combination culturally, it is no longer
an academic assertion that race, national origin, citizenship and
culture are not biological matters of blood. A worthwhile area
of inquiry for future scholarship would be immigration cases
presenting this type of divergence. Some would-be immigrants
strategically emigrate initially to another country from which
further emigration to the United States is easier than from their
original homeland.
133 Mexico would be further affected by per-country ceilings. 8
U.S.C. § 1152.
134 INA § 203(b)(5).
131 INA § 203(c).
136 See Kosova, supra note 23; Robert D. Kaplan, Frontier
Justice: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
Bureaucracy, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 1992, at 24.
137 As a result of the complexity of immigration law, the field is
crowded with purveyors of fraudulent documents. See Bill
Miller, INS Cracks Down on Immigration Fraud for Profit;
Consultants Who Falsify Documents, Arrange Phony Marriages
Are Target of Federal Probes, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1995, at
A8; Patrick McDonnell, Victimized Brothers Help End
Immigration Scam; Fraud; Illegal Immigrants from Oaxaca
Were Central to Suit That Unmasked Firm Selling Worthless
Papers to Foreigners, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at B1.
138 Stephen Engelberg, In Immigration Labyrinth, Corruption
Comes Easily, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at Al (part of a
series; describes bribery scandals in Arlington, Va., office of
INS, and other similar situations throughout the agency). Some
authors propose that the INS would better serve its contradictory
dual purposes of immigrant service and law enforcement if it
were divided into two separate agencies. See DANIEL W.
SUTHERLAND, CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (CEO) POLICY
BRIEF, ABOLISH THE INS: How FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY DOOMS
IMMIGRATION REFORM (1996).
139 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
14 0 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 58, 595 (1889)
(The Chinese Exclusion Case).
141 I have benefited greatly from the analyses of the plenary
power doctrine by other scholars. See especially Motomura,
Plenary Power, supra note 63, at 545-59 (tracing course of
"classical" immigration law); Motomura, Curious Evolution,
supra note 63, at 1632-38 (discussing Chae Chan Ping and
Fong Yue Ting); see also Henkin, supra note 63 (considering
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international law perspective); Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra
note 63 (discussing possible justifications for plenary power
doctrine); Schuck, supra note 63 (distinguishing between
"classical" immigration law and contemporary communitarian
immigration law).
This article does not analyze each of the possible
justifications for the plenary power doctrine, a task which
Stephen Legomsky performed admirably in his article. I have
tried to take up where Legomsky left off, considering how the
Court could progress beyond the plenary power doctrine, and
what the constitutional consequences might be. See Legomsky,
Plenary Power, supra note 63, at 305 ("[The] next stage [of
constitutional review of immigration law] will be marked by a
return to general principles of constitutional law.") Cf Schuck,
supra note 63, at 83-85 (discussing some possible approaches in
the absence of plenary power).
42 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4. If anything, "uniform Rule"
should be read to prevent racial discrimination. The other
enumerated power of that clause is to set "uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies." Nobody contends that Congress
possess "plenary power" over bankruptcy, beyond constitutional
limits.
141 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
'44 Id. at 599-600.
141 Id. at 596-98.
146The racial animosity that formed the background for the
Chinese Exclusion Act is described at length in the following
historical works. STUART C. MILLER, THE UNWELcOME
IMMIGRANT: THE AMERICAN IMAGE OF THE CHINESE, 1785-1882
(1969); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY:
LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA
(1971); see also Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle
for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First
Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REV. 529 (1984); Shirley Hune,
The Politics of Chinese Exclusion: Legislative-Executive
Conflict, 1876-1882, 9 AmERASIA J. 5 (1982). See generally
RONALD TAKAIU, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A
HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 79-131 (1989).
'47 See Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans
and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. REV. 225, 232
(1995) and sources cited therein.
148 Id.
149 See Hing, supra note 63, at 44-46.
1-o Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
151 Id.
152 The interpretation that follows is developed from Motomura,
Plenary Power, supra note 63, at 551. Cf Aleinikoff, Rights,
supra note 63, at 863 (describing international law perspective
on immigration as "understandable.").
153 The foreign relations aspect of the Chinese Exclusion Act are
described in Henkin, supra note 63, at 863-86 and Fitzpatrick &
Bennett, supra note 79, at 594-608. If immigration is evaluated
by international norms, the irony is that the Chinese Exclusion
Act breached international law obligations and agreements.
154 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604.
155 Id. at 595. Brimelow believes the case to have been decided
rightly. See BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at 214-15 (characterizing
argument as "maybe" having a "dark, nativistic motive" but
being "highly rational and a very specific complaint about the
difficulty of assimilating immigrants from what was then a pre-
modem society.").
156 Id. at 595.
157 Id. at 606.
158 Id.
"9 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
'60 Id. at 706.
161 Id. at 713.
'62 1d. at 711.
'6 Id. at 713.
'64 Id. at 712.
'65 Id. at 711-12.
166 Id. at 712.
'67 Id. at 729.
161 Id. at 730 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 598 (1889).
169 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 734 (1893).
Scholars have shown that Asian immigrants and European
immigrants displayed similar return rates to their homelands.
See, e.g., TAKAKI, supra note 146, at 11; Chan, European and
Asian Immigration into the United States in Comparative
Perspective, 1820s to 1920s, in IMMIGRATION RECONSIDERED,
supra note 15, at 37, 38.
170 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 734.
171 Id. at 738.
172 Id. at 737.
171 Id. at 743.
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174 id.
175 Id. at 757.
176 Cf LEGOMSKY, supra note 63, ch. 3; Michael Scaperlanda,
Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Legacy of Dissent in
FederalAlienage Cases, 8 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 1, 17-18 (1994).
'77 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Aleinikoff, Rights, supra note
63, at 864. A recent commentator, based on an exhaustive
survey of anti-Chinese case law, has concluded that Yick Wo
was a decision much more focused on economic rights of
corporations than equal protection of racial minorities. See
Thomas W. Joo, New "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases
and the Development of Substantive Due Process
Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F.L. REv. 353 (1995). Cf. Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (striking down
imprisonment without jury trial provisions of Chinese Exclusion
Act by distinguishing between those immigrants who "came into
the country with consent" and those who came "in disregard of
the law.").
17 8 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993).
19 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (The Japanese Immigrant Case).
1811 Id. at 97.
,8, Id. at 101-02.
1
82 The Court has ignored the plenary power doctrine on plenty
of occasions.
Unable to simply defer to Congress, the Court intervened
actively in a remarkable series of early twentieth century cases
defining what it meant to be a "white" person able to naturalize.
See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (Japanese
individual not permitted to naturalize because he was not white);
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1922) (Asian Indian
individual not permitted to naturalize because he was not white).
See IAN F. HANEY-LOPEZ, WHrTE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCrION OF RACE (1996).
More recently, the Supreme Court invalidated the
legislative veto in the immigration context. INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983). As Stephen Legomsky noted shortly after the
decision, its discussion ignored the plenary power doctrine.
Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra note 63, at 301-03.
Legomsky predicted that Chadha would "speed the demise of
the plenary power doctrine." Id. at 302. He has been incorrect,
alas. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary
Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995) (more cautious prediction that the
Supreme Court may "soften" the plenary power doctrine in the
future).
183 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320,
339 (1909) (upholding levy on carriers who had transported
inadmissible aliens).
184 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
544 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
185 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
186 Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
117 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
181 Id. at 765-766.
189 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
190 Id. at 792.
191 Id.
192 Id. (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)).
193 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 787.
194 Id.
'95 Id. at 798.
196 Id. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'97 Id. at 809.
'98 Id. at 795 n.6.
199 See Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra note 63, at 298. See
also Scaperlanda, supra note 176.
200See Stone v. INS, 115 S. Ct. 1537 (1995) (interpreting
statutory time period for filing appeal from deportation order as
not being tolled by motion for administrative reconsideration);
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (rejecting claim that
juvenile aliens unaccompanied by parents and awaiting
resolution of deportation proceedings had a right to be released
to the custody of responsible adults, with traditional recitation of
plenary power doctrine); INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants'
Rights, 502 U.S. 183 (1991) (explicitly narrow decision on
strictly statutory grounds concerning regulations that prohibited
aliens unable to work from working during pendency of
deportation proceedings).
Some earlier and similarly cursory statements of the
plenary power doctrine include: United States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864 (1982) (rejecting claim of Fifth or
Sixth Amendment violation by criminal defendant whose
potential witnesses were deported); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. I,
26 (1982) (striking down state regulation of aliens that
prevented them from acquiring state resident status for college
tuition purposes, observing in passing that plenary power does
not preempt all state regulation of aliens).
Kevin Johnson has offered another explanation. He refers
to Chevron deference to administrative agencies as possibly
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more powerful than the plenary power doctrine in insulating
immigration decisions from judicial review. See Kevin R.
Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain
Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71
N.C. L. REv. 413 (1993).
201 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
While the opinion labeled the Haitian immigrants "illegal," they
might have been "legal" at the end of the process on which they
were embarking, as they had a strong argument for asylum. As
Justice Blackmun pointed out, if the majority accepted that the
Haitian immigrants were "illegal," then the statute would have
limited the discretion of the executive branch. Id. at 2568
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2021d. at 2555 n.13 (Executive Order reproduced; facially
neutral); id. at 2549 (characterizing order as directed at
Haitians). I have relied on two articles written by Harold H.
Koh, who was counsel of record in the case. Harold H. Koh,
The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy,
103 YALE L.J. 2391 (1994) [hereinafter Koh, Haiti Paradigm];
Harold H. Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers
Council, 35 HARv. INT'LL.J. 1 (1994).
2'3 Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also
Koh, Haiti Paradigm, supra note 202, at 2416-19.
2m 113 S. Ct. at 2558-62, 2567.
2
0
5 See, e.g., Brief of the NAACP, Transafrica and
Congressional Black Caucus, Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents in Sale v. Hatian Ctrs., Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2549 (1993). Cf Peter J. Boyer, The Rise of Kweisi Mfume,
NEw YORKER, Aug. 1, 1994, at 27, 27 (quoting head of
Congressional Black Caucus as stating "if Haitians were not
black, we would not sit back and watch this murder occur.");
Koh, Haiti Paradigm, supra note 202, at 2413.
2m See Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence to the
Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic
Agendas in Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian
Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 1, 12-13, 26 (1993).
2w Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2561 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
20'Id. at 2577 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Koh, Haiti
Paradigm, supra note 202, at 2411-16.
20 Motomura, Plenary Power, supra note 63.
210 Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
211 Id. at 849.
212 Id. at 857.
213 Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 63.
214 896 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated without opinion, 925
F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (original opinion available on-line
only, 1990 WL 6857 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 2, 1990).
215 1990 WL 6857, at *1.
216 Id. at *2-4.
217 This would reconcile the discrimination against immigrants
at the border with the protection offered to them as immigrants
within the border, as expressed by Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down state public assistance
provisions that discriminated against noncitizens).
218 Id.; see also Bosniak, supra note 58 (analyzing decisions in
labor law that protect undocumented workers).
219 This again may be nothing more than an argument for
consistency: the Court could be less protective of immigrants
across the board.
220 See Motomura, Plenary Power, supra note 63, at 574, 600-
13; Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 63, at 1690-92,
1702-04.
22" 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This point is made by Motomura,
Plenary Power, supra note 63, at 551.
2n 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
223 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); compare Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
224Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (affirming
denial of law license to married woman with dicta concerning
the "wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of
man and woman" which is "recognized" in "the civil law, as
well as nature herself."). Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (heightened scrutiny for gender discrimination).
225 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927); compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
226 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 25 (1905). The age of the
plenary power doctrine can be measured against substantive due
process: the latter came into existence after the plenary power
doctrine and ceased to exist while the plenary power doctrine
continued to flourish. Cf. Henkin, supra note 63, at 859 n.26
(noting early traces of substantive due process at time of the
Chinese Exclusion Case).
227 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
m Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954) (upholding
deportation on basis of Communist Party membership).
229 For an extended discussion of the three arguments addressed
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here, see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-64 (1992) (joint opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, declining to overrule Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), on stare decisis grounds).
See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 723, especially 740-53 (1988)
(describing a coherent theory of stare decisis).
2'0 Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (explaining appropriate departure
from stare decisis in abandonment of substantive due process
and in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
231 United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2319 (1995).
232 Compare Adarand v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114-17 (1995).
233 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893)
(Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 744 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at
762 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 769 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 800 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23 The phrase is Stephen Legomsky's. Legomsky, supra note
63, at 929. See, e.g., Motomura, Plenary Power, supra note 63;
Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 63; Henkin, supra
note 63; Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra note 63.
235 Nobody, that is, except Peter Brimelow and others who
believe as he does. But see Peter J. Spiro, The States and
Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignities, 35 VA. J. INT'L
L. 121 (1994) (arguing that states should have greater leeway in
passing immigration legislation and focusing on federalism
concerns with apparent willingness to tolerate what would be
equal protection violations in other contexts).
Some scholars are confident that the Chinese Exclusion
Act, or its counterpart, could not be passed today as a political
matter, and also would not be sustained by the Court. See, e.g.,
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 13, at 160.
236 Cf. Viet Dinh, Law and Asylum, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION,
supra note 3, at 215, 220 (arguing without elaboration that "the
standards that we employ to exclude aliens have to reflect the
values of our society.").
237 U.S. CONST., amend. V, XIV. Another elaboration of the
argument that should appeal to judicial conservatives who are
consistent in their views is the reluctance to recognize implied
powers, rendered all the stronger here because the implied
power over immigration would seem to overpower express
guarantees of rights. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 599 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 757-58 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
238 U.S. CONST., amend, XIV, § 1.
239 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, Tim MORALITY OF CONsENT 33-54
(1975). Cf. JUDrrrTH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CmENsHiP: TE
QUEST FOR INCLUSION 16 (1991); Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying
U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT'L LAw 237 (1995)
(presenting different theories for understanding citizenship as a
concept); Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J.
INT'L LAW 279, especially 285-88, 290 (discussing why
citizenship is important as a means of inquiring who is eligible
to become a citizen). The short answer to Legomsky's query is
that citizenship can be better than race as a means of classifying
individuals.
24 BICK, supra note 239, at 36. As Bickel stated, "that is not
quite an end of the matter." Id. at 48. In a more difficult
passage to interpret, he then argued that "conditions may be
attached to entry permits" and "in time of war even resident
enemy aliens may be subject to fairly harsh restrictions"
(presumably a reference to the Japanese-American internment
cases). He suggested "that is a consequene ... or our
perception of the meaning of foreign citizenship and of the
obligations it may impose more than it is a consequence of our
own domestic law." Id. Bickel is much more helpful for
articulating the rights of immigrants than he is for the right to
immigrate. He implicitly distinguishes, as the Court has done,
between cases involving immigrants and cases involving
immigration.
241 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
242 BICKELL, supra note 239, at 41.
243 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
244 Id. at 42-43.
245 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that
facially neutral ordinance that had been applied in a racially
discriminatory manner could be struck down as
unconstitutional).
246 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (unanimous
decision holding that strict scrutiny did not apply to alienage in
the context of restrictions on Medicare entitlements).
247 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); cf.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
248 See especially Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 438-
40 (1982) (explaining distinction between "membership in the
political community" and "distribution of economic benefits.").
Cf. Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (applying
procedural due process standards for exclusion proceedings
involving permanent resident alien); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 647-48 (1973) (distinguishing between state alienage
discrimination in civil service positions and higher political
offices, or as voters, because the latter constitute "participation
in [the state's] democratic political institutions.") See generally
Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 63, at 1626 ("The
stunted growth of constitutional immigration law contrasts
sharply with the flowering of constitutional protections for
aliens in areas other than immigration law."), and at 1650-51
(arguing that the right-privilege distinction explains the
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characterization of deportation as civil rather than criminal).
Were the court (or legislatures) serious about the
distinction, they would consider granting permanent resident
aliens the right to vote at least in local elections. See Raskin,
supra note 63. In another example of constitutional doctrine
being blind to political practice, the advocates of restricting
immigration characterize violations of immigration law as
criminal or quasi-criminal. The political significance of
describing some immigrants as being "illegal" (rather than
"undocumented") should give the Court pause before it asserts
again that deportation is civil. But if the Court recognized that
deportation was criminal or quasi-criminal, it also might be
forced to apply constitutional principles to the process. Cf INS
v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), especially at 1056-57
(White, J., dissenting).
249 See Unz, supra note 84.
25 Cf. LEGOMSKY, supra note 63, at 273.
251 This renders inconsequential the point made by Chief Justice
Rehnquist that the citizen-alien distinction is mandated by the
Constitution. See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 651 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ('That distinction is constitutionally important in no
less than 11 instances in a political document noted for its
brevity.").
252 The Court is ready to revisit the issue of alienage as a suspect
classification. In its 1994-1995 term, it accepted certiorari in a
case where an insurance carrier had discriminated against an
Australian citizen who was a permanent resident alien, but
dismissed the case after it had settled. Geico v. Duane, 37 F.3d
1036 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted 115 S. Ct. 1251 (1995) and
cert. dismissed 115 S. Ct. 2272 (1995) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 bars
alienage discrimination). Cf. Neuman, supra note 12, at 1426-
30.
23 Cf Man J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent,
Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (analyzing
permissible accent discrimination as a proxy for prohibited race
discrimination).
254 In my opinion, it is worth taking the risk that the few
victories for immigrant rights achieved under plenary power will
be rendered less persuasive, because they are not likely to
endure without modification anyway. The greatest risk is the so-
called race-to-the-bottom, where governments faced with the
choice between offering an entitlement to everybody or nobody
choose the latter. See Spiro, supra note 235, at 151 n.128
(arguing that equal protection analysis would be incoherent
applied to aliens and would result in detriment to them due to a
race-to-the-bottom scenario). A more subtle risk is that
domestic constitutional standards will be weakened. It is
difficult to believe that equal protection doctrine could be so
undone as to reach the level of the plenary power doctrine; the
more likely problem is that other forms of deference will
paralyze the court. See Johnson, supra note 200.
255 The result in one pro-immigrant case might be reversed as a
result if First Amendment grounds could not be found as an
alternative basis to protect the individual. The Court rejected
the argument by the state of New York that it was acceptable to
discriminate against aliens unwilling to naturalize as soon as
they were qualified to do so. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S.
1 (1977).
26This border-interior distinction has been recognized in
immigration law for quite some time. See, e.g., Landon v.
Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("once an alien gains
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go
with permanent residence his constitutional status changes
accordingly.") Thus, if equal protection doctrine developed
along the lines suggested by critical race theorists, looking
toward subjugation or cultural meaning or other factors,
alienage may still be a candidate for suspect classification status.
For a discussion of problems with a more 'complex
approach to alienage, see Neuman, supra note 12, at 1426-40.
257 It would not run afoul of Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); United States ex rel. Knauft v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); or cases in other
contexts in which the Supreme Court has for all practical
purposes indicated that constitutional standards have limited
extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990) (no Fourth Amendment
rights applicable when U.S. officials conduct a search in
Mexico). In this respect, the arguments advanced here differ
from those offered by Professor Henkin. They do not depend on
any understanding that the Constitution governs foreign affairs.
See Henkin, supra note 63; Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra
note 63, at 275-77.
218 See Carens, Open Borders, supra note 62, especially at 270.
29The relationship between traditional civil rights and
immigrant rights would bear a family resemblance to the
relationships among anti-discrimination laws covering race,
gender, disability, and sexual orientation.
260 These impacts have always existed, but are acknowledged
only occasionally. Schuck, for example, stated that Prop. 187
would likely result in "many U.S. citizens and legal aliens"
being "caught up in the dragnet" along with "families in which
some members have legal status.., while others.., do not."
Schuck, supra note 77, at 89. Although Schuck recognized the
link between immigration and citizens who are racial minorities,
and also identified himself as a "friend of immigration," he
nonetheless analyzed the measure in familiar terms when he
presented the question "Do Outsiders Have Claims on Us?" Id.
at 85, 91. Judith Shklar has argued persuasively for considering
the "standing of citizens," defining standing in a broad and
colloquial sense rather than a technical legal sense. See SHKLAR,
supra note 239, at 2.
261 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 800 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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262 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 99, at 1.
263 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION
REFORM-EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF
DISCRIMINATION 5-7 (1990) (concluding that after IRCA,
national origin discrimination presented "a serious pattern of
discrimination"), The "suspicion" of Asian Americans calls
forth the nineteenth-century presumption that Chinese laborers
were not entitled to be in the United States unless they produced
a certificate required by the Chinese Exclusion Act.
264 Cf. Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 63, at 1657-58
(presenting hypothetical cases contrasting claim of race
discrimination in mainstream constitutional law and immigration
constitutional law).
265 See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 787; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972); Escobar v. INS, 896 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
vacated without opinion 925 F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1991); cf
Peter H. Schuck & Theodore H. Wang, Continuity and Change:
Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45
STAN. L. REV. 115, 147-49 (1992) (describing affirmative
challenges to immigration statutes brought by citizens, including
citizens seeking to restrict immigration by curtailing
employment of alien workers); Patricia D. Rudloff, In Re
Oluloro: Risk of Female Genital Mutilation as "Extreme
Hardship" in Immigration Proceedings, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 877
(1995) (reporting unpublished opinion of immigration judge
suspending deportation of foreign national who was the mother
of citizen children, who if they accompanied their mother to her
homeland, would have faced female genital mutilation as ritual
practice).
There also are cases in which citizen co-plaintiffs have
escaped attention. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 213
n.1 (1984) (holding that INS workplace search was not a
detention or seizure subject to constitutional constraints).
Immigration restrictionists who sued seeking to
accomplish their goals might attempt to invoke citizen standing,
but they have been unsuccessful in the past for reasons that
should still preclude their efforts, e.g., lack of injury in fact. See
FAIR v. Reno, 897 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1995). See also
Northwestern Forest Workers Ass'n. v. Lyng, 688 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1988) (holding without analysis that citizen plaintiffs
had standing to challenge pro-immigrant administrative agency
interpretation of Special Agricultural Workers program), later
proceedings sub. nom; Wint v. Yuetter, 902 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir.
1990). The FAIR case offers support for abolishing the plenary
power doctrine from an unusual source. Although ultimately
ruling in favor of the government, which was in the unusual
position of ostensibly defending its relatively pro-immigrant
stance, the court rejected the government's argument that
immigration legislation presented a nonjusticiable political
question. Id. at 9.
On standing in race-related cases, see Reggie Oh & Frank
Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme Court
Moves from Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to
Disapproving Affirmative Action for African Americans, 1
MICH. J. LAW & RACE (forthcoming 1996); Girardeau A. Spann,
Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422 (1995)
(arguing that Supreme Court standing analysis in race cases has
discriminated due to results-oriented bias disfavoring
minorities).
2 6 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
267 Id. at 647.
268 id.
269 Wauchope v. United States, 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993).
270 Id. at 1409.
271 Id. at 1411.
272 1d. The Wauchope decision has been followed with respect
to standing and distinguished on the merits. In Ablang v. Reno,
another Ninth Circuit panel reasoned that a Fiallo type claim
could be brought by a child seeking to establish citizenship
through her relationship to her father, but that Fiallo also
controlled and required minimal rationality review.
Accordingly, the case was dismissed. Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d
801, 805 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3465
(1996). The Ablang court characterized the Wauchope decision
in a manner that supports citizen standing but contradicts Fiallo:
"Wauchope concerned the right of United States citizen mothers
to transmit citizenship to their children born abroad according to
the same standards set for United States citizen fathers." Id. at
804, 805-06. See also Aguayo v. Christopher, 865 F. Supp. 479
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (following Wauchope); Le Brun v. Thornburgh,
777 F. Supp. 1204, 1209-10 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding in favor of
citizen standing); contra Tranter v. Secretary of State, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8824 (D.D.C. May 17, 1994) (holding against
citizen standing due to inability to redress any alleged harm,
because courts could not confer citizenship); compare Acosta v.
Gaffney, 413 F. Supp. 827 (D.N.J. 1976) (withholding
deportation of alien parents because deportation of citizen child
would result), rev'd 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977).
273 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
274 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Cf Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); (rejecting claim that citizens
interested in being an audience for a Marxist author had a First
Amendment right to hearing him speak).
275 Francis Fukuyama, for example, has made the futile and
likely infuriating claim that the new immigrants espouse
traditional American and especially conservative values, almost
more than many native-born citizens. See Fukuyama, supra
note 3; Fukuyama, supra note 11. A negative reaction
anticipating these arguments can be found in James J. Treires,
The Dark Side of the Dream, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1989, at 10;
cf. BRImELoW, supra note 6, at 180-81, 269-72.
276 Professor Motomura has argued persuasively that
constitutional standards have worked their way into immigration
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law, in the form of statutory construction abrogating the plenary
power doctrine. See Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note
63.
277 See Johnson, Race, supra note 94, at 661-72 (describing
difficulties of challenging immigration laws on constitutional
grounds).
271 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). Adarand, incidentally, emphasizes
consistency between federal and state equal protection analysis.
This suggests that the Court may be willing to depart from its
federal-state distinction in immigration regulation, though
whether it would tend toward the former or the latter is unclear.
279Id. at 2117.
no Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
21 See Karst, supra note 63.
282 Likewise, Fiallo, if it presented itself again, would be
resolved by reference to then prevailing standards for
discrimination on the basis of birth, legitimacy and gender.
2
8
3 See Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2117.
2
8
4 See Fukuyama, supra note 11, at 77 (arguing that race,
culture and socioeconomic status are different, and that "the
common American culture... is actually a sectarian Protestant
Anglo-Saxon culture that was somehow detached from its ethnic
roots, mixed with universalistic Lockean-liberal principles, and
adopted by the non-Anglo-Saxon, non-Protestant immigrants
from Europe who arrived subsequently, and who then
intermarried to such an extent that it is no longer meaningful to
try to determine what proportion of the country is descended
from Italians, Swedes, and the like.").
215 Even Carens agrees that some limitations might be
appropriate. Carens, Open Borders, supra note 62, at 260, 270;
Joseph H. Carens, Nationalism and the Exclusion of
Immigrants: Lessons From Australian Immigration Policy, in
OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? THE ETHICAL AND
POLITICAL ISSUES 41, 59 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988).
286 Lind, supra note 5, at A19 (also arguing that "pro-labor
liberals and non-racist populists on the right should unite to
demand an immigration policy that puts the interests of
American workers above the interests of the native rich."). Cf
SIMON, supra note 111, at 318-19, 320 (policy recommendations
including anti-discrimination laws and also cuts in welfare
entitlements).
287 Loury, supra note 11.
2
88 The economic impact of immigration is not considered here,
save to note that it is the economic impact of migrants that leads
to legislation which violates the right to interstate travel. I have
relied on the following major studies on the many sides of the
issues: FIX & PASSEL, supra note 58; SIMON, FACTS, supra note
87; SIMON, supra note 111. See also GEORGE J. BORIAS,
FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE
U.S. ECONOMY (1990); George J. Boras, The Economics of
Immigration, 32 J. ECON. Lrr. 1667 (1994) (updating Boras'
earlier study); George J. Borjas, Know the Flow; Economics of
Immigration, NAT'L REV., Apr. 17, 1995, at 7 (presenting mass
media version of his research results); DONALD HUDDLE, THE
COST OF IMMIGRATION (1993) (the Huddle study, which was
widely reported in the media, is critiqued in Fix & PASSEL,
supra note 58, and SIMON, supra note 82. See also BRIMELOW,
supra note 6, at 137-77; see generally THOMAS MULLER,
IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CITY (1993). For information
concerning estimates of the undocumented immigrant
population, one of the most controversial areas of the debate, see
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: DESPITE
DATA LIMITATIONS, CURRENT METHODS PROVIDE BETTER
POPULATION ESTIMATES (1993).
289 BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at xvii.
290 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
29'1d. at 431.
2 Id. at 433.
293 Some sophisticated writers also assume that constitutional
standards apply to immigration. See, e.g., James C. Clad,
Slowing the Wave, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1994, at 139, 150
('The United States has the sovereign right, if it constitutionally
reflects the majority view, to exclude others from coming here.
It is that simple; it is that awkward.") (emphasis added).
294 See Paul Feldman, Uncertainty, Lawsuits Would Greet Prop.
187; Election: Many Hospitals, Clinics Have Yet to Prepare
Contingency Plans; Disobedience and Confusion Predicted,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1994, at Al, Al (quoting sponsor of
measure, "The purpose of the initiative is to have the court
revisit and reconsider the Plyler case. Passage of the initiative
will provide that vehicle."); Doreen Carrajal, Prop. 187 Has
Even Backers a Bit Uneasy; Although It Still Has Substantial
Appeal, 62% Say They Would Not Turn in an Undocumented
Student - Which Initiative Would Require, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1994, at Al, Al (quoting voter who supported the measure, "it's
just to send a message.., it will be ruled unconstitutional.").
295 See H. Eric Schockman, Why Prop. 187 Needs Judicial
Review: The "Voices of the People" May Mandate the Law, But
Constitutional Principles Form the Rule of Law, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1995, at B19. Cf. Schuck, supra note 77, at 92
(observing that Governor Pete Wilson "surely knows that Prop.
187 could have dire practical consequences for his state" and
speculating "he may secretly hope that an activist court will
rescue him by striking it down.").
296 Cf Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 63, at 1631.
Two other articles from Latino perspectives have focused on the
relationship of progressive immigration reform to traditional
civil rights. Rachel F. Moran, Foreward - Demography and
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Distrust: The Latino Challenge to Civil Rights and Immigration
Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1995)
(suggesting that Brown v. Board of Education model of civil
rights litigation is inappropriate for Latinos and may be
anachronistic for African Americans as well); Kevin R. Johnson,
Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino
Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAzA L.J. 42,
especially 55-65 (1995) (analyzing "immigration as a dividing
line" in the civil rights coalition). Ignatius Bau has written an
article from an Asian American perspective based on his
experience in the Prop. 187 campaign. Bau, supra note 27. See
also William R. Tamayo, When the Colored are Neither Black
Nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and
Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. I (1995).
297 Bill Ong Hing has argued at length that the Asian American
community must be understood as having been constituted by
immigration policies. See HING, supra note 13. Cf Steven A.
Holmes, Anti-Immigrant Mood Moves Asians to Organize, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 1996, at Al, Al (quoting Karen Narasaki, Asian
American civil rights leader, "For Asian Americans, because of
their history, [immigration] is a cornerstone of what civil rights
means to the community.").
298 See, e.g., COSE, supra note 15, at 205 (quoting U.S.
Representative Smith, "no other nation in the world has the
delusion that it can ignore its own poor while importing a whole
generation of poor people every year" and arguing that the
nation has a choice between importing workers or training "our
own underclass.").
299See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at 173-75; Lawrence
Fuchs, What Do Immigrants Deserve? A Warm Welcome and
the Usual Benefits - But Not Affirmative Action, WASH. POST,
Jan. 29, 1995, at C2; Mark Krikorian, Affirmative Action and
Immigration, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE,
GENDER, ETHNICrrY, AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION 300
(Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) (FAIR representative arguing that
affirmative action for some racial groups effectively subsidizes
immigrants at the expense of native-born citizens). The Fuchs
article is significant because the author, the former executive
director of SCIRP, is considered more moderate on immigration
issues. In an odd bit of dicta, Justice Stevens in an affirmative
action case alluded to undocumented immigration. He stated
that unlike blacks who had been enslaved, "the 'Spanish-
speaking' subclass [of the program] came voluntarily,frequently
without invitation..." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
538 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1 The article that introduced the "blacks versus browns"
dilemma is Miles, supra note 3, especially at 138-41. See also
Peter H. Schuck, The Evolving Civil Rights Movement: Old
Civil Rights and New Immigration, CURRENT, Jan. 1994, at 13.
Cf. BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at 103-04, 242-43.
3() See Wu, supra note 147, at 263 and accompanying notes.
"2 See Adarand v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
303 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 152 (4th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
304 Memorandum Decision and Order, Ho v. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., Case No. C-94-2418 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 28,
1995) (denying motion to dismiss filed by defendant) (order
marked as not for publication; on file with author); Selena
Dong, Note, "Too Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting
Discrimination Against Asian Americans and Preserving
Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1995).
305 Sandy Theis, Suit Targets Minority Set-Asides: Black Claims
Asian Indians Not Eligible, CINCINNATI ENQ., May 23, 1995, at
B I; see also Frank H. Wu, Race Dynamics: The Case of Two
Asian American Schoolgirls in Maryland Proves a Landmark
for Affirmative Action, ASIAN WEEK, Sept. 22, 1995, at 9
(describing controversy over the enrollment of two children of
mixed Caucasian-Asian background in suburban Washington,
D.C. magnet school in a district seeking to maintain racial
balance); Dan Boyers, Montgomery Reverses Itself, Lets Asian
Girls Switch Schools, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1995, at Al
(same).
306 Daniel M. Weintraub, Crime, Immigration Issues Helped
Wilson, Poll Finds; Election: Proposition 187 Wins Among
Whites, But Loses Among All Other Ethnic Groups, Exit Survey
Shows, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, at Al.
307 Brimelow owns up to his political agenda. BRIMELOW, supra
note 6, at 195-201. The real problem with "the immigration
pincers" is the possibility that "the Clinton administration's
electoral coalition may be a harbinger of politics to come." That
coalition - "Southerners used to call them 'scalawags'
consists of blacks, Hispanics, Jews and minority whites. Id. at
197.
308 Ile tensions among people of color, especially African
Americans and recent immigrants (some of whom are of African
origin or are considered black within American society), can be
acute. See Morrison, supra note 3; Wanda Coleman, Blacks,
Immigrants and America: Remembering Latasha, NATION, Feb.
13, 1993, at 187 (arguing "as a price of entry, the majority of
immigrants buy into the lie of American apartheid: Black people
are inferior."). Cf. COSE, supra note 15, at 151 (NAACP
endorsed early version of IRCA) and 214 (Los Angeles African
American clergyman argued that Latinos brought in to weaken
black voting power); MULLER, supra note 288, at 56 (NAACP
opposition to undocumented immigration), 91-98 (historical
views of African Americans), 167-94 (economic impact of
immigration on African Americans); Lawrence H. Fuchs, The
Reactions of Black Americans to Immigration, in IMMIGRATION
RECONSIDERED, supra note 15, at 293; Bill Ong Hing,
Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African
Americans, 37 How. L.J. 237 (1994); ARNOLD M. SHANKMAN,
AMBIVALENT FRIENDS: AFRO-AMERICANS VIEW THE IMMIGRANT
(1982).
309 See Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra note 63, at 269-70
(discussing guest theory of immigration restriction). Walzer
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rejects this view that members, once accepted, can continue to
be distinguished. WALzER, supra note 57, at 62.
30 In the 1996 Republican Presidential primary season, U.S.
Senator Phil Gramm made this suggestion, prompting rival U.S.
Senator Bob Dole to criticize him for proposing a form of
second-class citizenship. See Brownstein, supra note 5.
311 Peter Brimelow, Whose Country Is It Anyway?, WASH. POST,
Oct. 15, 1995, at C4.
312 Cf Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707 (1993); Ian H. Lopez, The
Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1994).
313 Adarand v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2101 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia's statement should be read against
earlier formulations of color-blindness. See Wu, supra note 95.
Gabriel Chin has exposed an overlooked aspect of the first
Justice Harlan's celebrated dissent exalting color-blindness in
Plessy v. Ferguson. While Justice Harlan proclaimed that
color-blindness should be the constitutional norm, he also
contrasted Chinese immigrants unfavorable with African
Americans. See Gabriel Chin, A Streetcar Named Harlan:
Asian Americans and John Marshall Harlan's Dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson (forthcoming 1996; manuscript on file with author).
Ian Haney Lopez also has pointed out that "the alien land
law, which transformed the phrase 'alien ineligible for
citizenship' into a tool for discrimination against Japanese
noncitizens, shows the ease with which discriminatory statutes
can be drafted without explicit reference to race." See Lopez,
supra note 312, at 141. By excluding Japanese immigrants from
citizenship for racial reasons, the law could continue to
discriminate against them without the need for any racial
reference.
314 BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at 270.
315 Id.
316 id.
317 Id.; see also id. at 274 (arguing that intermarriage cannot
work "two ways" if it is to be effective, but must be of
nonwhites into the white majority). Where all of this leaves
African Americans is anybody's guess, but Brimelow provides
no answer on that score. See Glazer, supra note 11, at 78 ("one
reason [Brimelow] spends so little time on the issue [of the
impact of immigration on blacks] is that he makes so much of
the white and European ethnic and racial character of the
American nation. He is therefore at a loss as to how to make his
argument if he gives full weight to the fact that at its founding
the nation was 20% black, and it is now 12% and modestly
rising.").
318 See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at 215-16 (distinguishing
today's immigrants from "the Orient" from nineteenth century
Irish immigrants, because "Irish Americans have earned the hard
way their right to opinions about who and how many their
country can absorb."). Brimelow's argument fails factually, for
large numbers of Irish and large numbers of Chinese arrived in
America simultaneously.
319 BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at xviii-xix, 209 (Constitution
being designed to form a more perfect Union for "'ourselves and
our posterity' - the Founder's posterity, not posterity in
general.").
320 Auster, supra note 3, at 175.
321 Sympathetic readers of the manuscript version of this article
have noted that this argument, though compelling, may be
thought to cast doubt on historical rationales for affirmative
action. Without addressing at length the different rationales for
affirmative action, and the meaning of that debate, I accept the
consequences of consistency here because I am convinced that
contemporary rather than historical justifications for affirmative
action are both more compelling and more likely to be held
constitutional. Like the arguments about immigration, the
arguments about affirmative action must take account of history
in order to understand, not to blame.
322 Brimelow concedes as much. BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at
76-84.
323 Brimelow asserts that the 1965 Act discriminates against
European immigrants. This claim is credible only if one accepts
that the prior system - which intentionally and clearly
discriminated in favor of European immigrants - was somehow
neutral. Id. at 79.
324 See Stephen Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity,
31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1993); CosE, supra note 15,
at 195-208 (discussing legislative history of "diversity" lottery).
325 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965
(NA), Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 203(c), 79 Stat. 911, codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
"Diversity" benefiting whites in immigration and
"diversity" benefiting any particular group in affirmative action
share an equally weak justification. If proportionate
representation were the only goal, diversity should benefit
whites in immigration. But given that proportionate
representation as a sole measurement of racial justice has long
since been rejected by the courts and abandoned as an argument
for affirmative action, it cannot serve to justify "diversity" in
immigration for groups already advantaged within the polity.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); William Bradford
Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of
Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFF.
OF LEGAL POL'Y, REDEFINING DIscRImINATION: "DISPARATE
IMPACr" AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (1988).
To be fair, Brimelow seems no happier about the benefits
to Irish foreign nationals, because the lottery "pass[ed] up any
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chance to ensure that these immigrants met American needs,"
and he attacks Sen. Edward Kennedy for sponsoring the
measure "above all for relatives of [his] Massachusetts
constituents." BRIMELOW, supra note 6, at 83. Brimelow also
acknowledges that the benefit to African foreign nationals was
incidental rather than intentional. Id.
326 71 INTERP. REL. 451 (1994).
327 Cf Peter Schuck, supra note 64, at 44 ("In a democracy,
demography is political destiny."). This is not to equate Peter
Schuck with Peter Brimelow.
328 See Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal
History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186
(1985) and Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss
Saigon Syndrome," in ASIAN AMERICANS AND TE SUPREME
COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087 (Hyung-chan Kim ed.,
1992). In both articles, Professor Gotanda argues that Asian
Americans have been cast in a citizen-foreigner paradigm rather
than a black-white paradigm which makes it easier to approve of
discrimination against them. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
329 Alternatively, the success of attacks on affirmative action
should make it much more difficult to sustain limits on
immigration. As philosopher Frederick Whelan observes with a
rhetorical question, classical liberalism would seem to prefer
allocation of job opportunities based on merit "regardless of
international borders or the nationality of the applicant."
Whelan, supra note 56, at 8-9.
330 See Louis Henkin, Immigration and the Constitution: A
Clean Slate, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 333, 333 (1994) ("[t]he ideology
of our time is 'the rule of law' or, better, 'constitutionalism."').
Cf Koh, Haiti Paradigm, supra note 207, at 2398 (describing
transnational public law litigation, which immigration cases may
sometimes be, as exhibiting a distinctive feature: "the litigants'
strategic awareness of the transportability of [transnational]
norms" to domestic "political bargaining."); LEGOMSKY, supra
note 63, at 273-80, 298-30 (discussing general theories of
judicial review within constitutional democracy).
331 CCRI will be replaced with a proposition number if it
appears on the ballot. Prop. 187 started as "S.O.S." - "Save
Our State" - the initials being interpreted in parodies very
quickly.
332 For analysis of the role of race in the Prop. 187 campaign, I
have relied primarily on Johnson, Race, supra note 94; Kevin R.
Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the
Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAzA L.J.
42 (1995); Ignatius Bau, Immigrant Rights: A Challenge to
Asian Pacific American Political Influence, 5 ASIAN AM. POL'Y
REV. 7 (1995); William R. Tamayo, When the Colored are
Neither Black Nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights
Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. 1 (1995);
Charles R. Lawrence, Foreword: Race, Multi-Culturalism and
the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819
(1995) (introduction to symposium issue on race and remedy in
a multicultural society).
333 For perspectives during the campaign on Prop. 187 and
African Americans, see Kevin Ross, Prop. 187, Is Brown-Latino
Friction a Voting Booth Issue? Yes; The Initiative Is Horrible
Legislation, But It's Still a Focal Point for Legitimate African
American Resentments, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at B5; John
W. Mack, Prop. 187, Is Brown-Latino Friction a Voting Booth
Issue? No; The Initiative's Backers Would Put All Minorities in
the Same Boat; African Americans Won't Escape Harm, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at B7; Evelyn C. White, Immigration a
Tough Call for Blacks: Proposition 187 Debate Has Stirred
Deep Feelings, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 10, 1994, at AI.
334 The role of Hispanics, to use the Census classification,
renders the reversal somewhat incomplete, because they may be
victims of Prop. 187 and CCRI. It may be that internal ethnic
divisions and generational divisions among Hispanics, however,
resemble the African American-Asian American tensions. See
Johnson, supra note 332, at 65-72.
335 Benjamin Pimentel, Asian Americans' Awkward Status:
Some Feel Whites Use Them as 'Racial Wedge' With Others,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 22, 1995, at Al.
336 see Wu, supra note 147; Dong, supra note 304.
337 See Schuck & Wang, supra note 272 (empirical analysis of
immigration litigation, both INS enforcement actions and
affirmative challenges brought by immigrants showing rise over
the time period studied).
338 See, e.g., American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F.
Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (The ABC Case), discussed in
Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 63, at 1675-78;
Russell, supra note 103, at 51.
339 While it should be unnecessary, along the lines of
Brimelow's attempt to cloak himself in his immigrant status to
preempt any argument that he is a racist, I point out that I am a
native-born American citizen to dispel any suspicion that I may
be biased by my status. In the interest of disclosure, I also
mention that from June to September 1994 I worked as a full-
time volunteer for Californians United Against Prop. 187, a
grassroots campaign centered in the San Francisco Bay Area.
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